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INTRODUCTION 
The current standards for denying and cancelling trademarks under 
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act are insufficiently clear to prevent trademark 
examiners and administrative judges from employing viewpoint-based 
discrimination against owners of marks that are perceived to be immoral, 
scandalous, or disparaging. Since trademark protection is a grant of speech 
rights to mark owners, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) 
discretionary decisions to deny or cancel the registration of marks that 
represent particular viewpoints under section 2(a) are at odds with the First 
Amendment protections afforded to both commercial and expressive speech. 
This Comment proposes that to protect the First Amendment rights of mark 
owners, the PTO should employ a policy that all allegedly immoral, scandalous, 
or disparaging marks are presumptively valid and can be denied registration 
or cancelled only upon a showing that the proposed marks are within the 
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specific categories of speech deemed to be outside the realm of First Amendment 
protection. Stricter standards for denying and cancelling trademarks under 
section 2(a) will allow the commercial marketplace and the marketplace of 
ideas to determine the fate of these so-called “undesirable” trademarks. 
Part I introduces Lanham Act section 2(a), the statute authorizing the 
denial of registration for trademarks that are immoral, scandalous, or 
disparaging. I discuss the PTO’s procedures for granting and denying 
trademarks, and compare the PTO’s purported procedures with how the 
office actually makes decisions. I then argue that this process is infused with 
discretionary decisionmaking that allows examiners to incorporate their own 
opinions on the propriety of marks into the section 2(a) analysis. In Part II, 
I analyze the PTO’s rates of granting and denying registration to allegedly 
scandalous and disparaging trademarks under section 2(a) and the evidence 
used to support such decisions. In Part III, I assess the effects of trademark 
denial and cancellation on mark owners. In Part IV, I discuss the First 
Amendment doctrine of viewpoint discrimination, its interaction with the 
doctrines of commercial speech and administrative discretion, and how it 
applies to trademark registration and the PTO. I conclude that section 2(a) 
is a restriction on viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. In Part V, 
I analyze how the discretionary procedures in the PTO lead to viewpoint 
discrimination. Finally, in Part VI, I propose changes to the section 2(a) 
regime to limit discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. I argue that the PTO 
should adopt the presumption that potentially scandalous and disparaging 
trademarks are valid absent section 2(a) challenges from third parties in 
opposition or cancellation proceedings. I also propose that section 2(a) 
denials should be limited to traditionally unprotected categories of speech, 
allowing the marketplaces of commerce and ideas to limit the propagation of 
trademarks that are seen as scandalous or disparaging. 
I. LANHAM ACT SECTION 2(A) AND RELATED PTO PROCEDURES  
FOR SCANDALOUS AND DISPARAGING TRADEMARKS 
This Comment focuses on the PTO’s application of Lanham Act section 
2(a) to deny or cancel trademark registrations at both the initial examination 
stage and in proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board 
(TTAB). Section 2(a) proscribes registration of trademarks that “[c]onsist[] 
of or comprise[] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which 
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
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disrepute . . . .”1 The PTO has tended to group denials under section 2(a) 
into two broad categories: marks that are immoral or scandalous, and marks 
that are disparaging to persons or groups.2 However, determining which 
marks fall into these categories is largely subjective because of a lack of 
defined legislative intent and the PTO’s failure to specifically articulate 
standards for applying these bars to registration in administrative and judicial 
proceedings. The vagueness of the statutory language leads the PTO to use 
subjective standards and creates First Amendment problems. In effect, the 
TTAB can selectively deny registration to marks under section 2(a) on the basis 
of the viewpoints the marks express. 
A. The History of Section 2(a) 
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 “with the dual objectives of 
protecting the consuming public from deception and protecting the mark 
holder from misappropriation.”3 The Act’s legislative history also indicates 
an intent to reduce arbitrariness and simplify the procedures for granting 
trademarks at the federal level.4 The opening language of section 2 reflects 
these goals: “No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the 
principal register on account of its nature unless . . . .”5 By presuming that all 
trademarks are registerable unless they fall under one of the bars to 
registration listed in section 2, the Lanham Act simplifies the application and 
registration process and protects the rights of the mark owner by allowing 
him to register his mark as quickly as possible in order to reap the benefits of 
federal trademark registration and enforce the mark against potential infringers. 
Section 2(a) does not accomplish the objectives described above. 
Prohibiting trademarks on the basis of their scandalous or disparaging 
content does not prevent consumer deception so long as the marks identify 
their source, and does not prevent misappropriation because the mark owner 
gets no protection if the content of the mark is barred under section 2(a). 
 
1 Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
2 See TMEP §§ 1203.01, 1203.03 (8th ed. July 2015) (describing separate PTO procedures for 
assessing scandalous and disparaging marks). 
3 Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging Marks Under the 
Lanham Act: Who Has Standing to Sue?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 257 (2004). 
4 See FRITZ G. LANHAM, PROVIDING FOR THE REGISTRATION OF TRADE-MARKS USED 
IN COMMERCE, TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2 (1939) (“The purpose 
of this bill is to simplify and make registration more liberal, to dispense with mere technical 
prohibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple and inexpensive, and relief against 
infringement prompt and effective.”). 
5 Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
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Furthermore, section 2(a) inquiries are inherently arbitrary because they rely 
on examiners to parse public sentiment towards allegedly disparaging and 
scandalous words, a wholly subjective inquiry.6 
So what, then, justifies a statutory prohibition on the registration of 
scandalous and disparaging marks? The legislative history provides no clues 
as to Congress’s intent.7 Based on the statutory text and court decisions, 
however, scholars generally agree on four justifications for the section 2(a) 
bars to registration: 
The federal government (1) “should not create the appearance that it 
favors or approves the use of scandalous, immoral and disparaging 
trademarks”; (2) “should not squander its precious time and resources” on 
such marks; (3) “should promote the public health, welfare, and morals by 
discouraging the[ir] use” . . . ; and (4) “should protect the sensitivities of 
those in public who might be offended” by [such marks].8 
These justifications are purportedly served through the trademark examination 
process under section 2(a); however, they also open the door to justifying 
discrimination against marks on the basis of viewpoint. 
B. The Trademark Examination Process 
The PTO controls the process for federal registration of trademarks.9 
Under the Lanham Act, a mark owner must complete a five-stage PTO 
application process to register a mark: “(1) application, (2) examination,  
(3) publication in the PTO’s Official Gazette, (4) opposition, and  
(5) registration.”10 The application must include the name and address of the 
applicant, a representation of the mark (either words or an image), a listing 
of the goods or services for which the mark will be used, and the appropriate 
filing fee.11 
 
6 See generally infra Section I.C and Part II (discussing how and when marks are deemed 
scandalous or disparaging). 
7 See Oswald, supra note 3, at 265 (“The legislative history of Section 2(a) is frustratingly silent 
as to why the Lanham Act denies registration to scandalous or disparaging matter.”). 
8 Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. Murphy, Calling Bulls**t on the Lanham Act: The 2(a) Bar 
for Immoral, Scandalous, and Disparaging Marks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 468 (2011) (citing 
Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous 
and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 788 (1993)). 
9 BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS 
TORTS 125 (2011). 
10 Id. 
11 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION  
§ 19:46 (4th ed. 2015). 
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After the mark owner submits an application, it is initially reviewed by a 
PTO examining attorney.12 “If the examining attorney identifies a 
substantive problem with the application, she will typically issue an ‘Office 
Action’ rejecting the application and explaining the basis for the rejection. 
The applicant is given six months to respond.”13 If the applicant does not 
respond, the mark is deemed “abandoned” and will not proceed to publication.14 
However, if the applicant responds to the Office Action, the examining 
attorney will reexamine the application in light of any evidence or arguments 
provided by the applicant.15 After reexamination, the examining attorney will 
issue a final rejection if she determines that the mark does not satisfy the 
requirements of the Lanham Act.16 The applicant can appeal that rejection 
within six months to the TTAB, an administrative body within the PTO, and 
finally to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.17 
If the mark is approved by the examining attorney, it is published in the 
PTO Official Gazette.18 Within thirty days of publication, “[a]ny person who 
believes that he would be damaged by the registration of [the] mark” may file 
an opposition with the PTO.19 If registration is not successfully opposed, the 
mark is registered on the Principal Register and receives the statutory 
protections of registration.20 However, after registration, anyone who 
believes that he has been or will be damaged by the mark may file a petition 
to cancel it.21 This petition can be filed within five years of registration, or at 
any time if “[the mark’s] registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary 
to the provisions of [Lanham Act section 4] or of [Lanham Act sections 2(a), 
(b), or (c)].”22 Cancellation proceedings are adjudicated by the TTAB and 
“progress[] as in any inter partes proceeding before” the Board.23 
 
12 BEEBE ET AL., supra note 9, at 129. 
13 Id. 
14 Lanham Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b) (2012). 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 BEEBE ET AL., supra note 9, at 129; see also Lanham Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (2012) (“An 
appeal may be taken to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board from any final decision of the 
examiner in charge of the registration of marks upon the payment of the prescribed fee.”); id.  
§ 21(a)(1), § 1071(a)(1) (“An applicant for registration of a mark . . . who is dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Director or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, may appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”). 
18 Lanham Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (2012). 
19 Id. § 13(a), § 1063(a). 
20 Id. § 13(b)(1), § 1063(b)(1); see also infra Section III.A (describing the statutory benefits of 
registration). 
21 Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012). 
22 Id. § 14(3), § 1064(3). This Comment focuses on cancellations of registered trademarks in 
violation of section 2(a), which can be filed at any time. 
23 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 20:43. 
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Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides the substantive bases for rejecting 
a trademark application or cancelling a registered mark. These bars to 
registration include marks that are immoral, scandalous, or disparaging; 
marks that are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception through their 
resemblance to other marks; and marks that are merely descriptive of the 
goods to which they are affixed.24 
In assessing a trademark application, the examining attorney follows the 
guidelines set forth in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 
(TMEP). According to the TMEP, “Trademark Examining Attorneys will 
be governed by the applicable statutes, the Trademark Rules of Practice, 
decisions, and Orders and Notices issued by the Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, Commissioners, or Deputy Commissioners.”25 An 
examining attorney’s initial examination must be “complete” and “must also 
clearly explain all refusals and requirements.”26 
C. PTO Procedures Under Section 2(a): Determining Whether Marks  
Are Scandalous or Disparaging 
1. Purported Examination Procedures of the PTO 
According to the TTAB and the courts, the PTO is supposed to resolve 
any doubts as to the disparaging or scandalous nature of a mark in favor of 
the applicant and then allow for opposition proceedings to assess any section 
2(a) issues before the mark is registered on the Principal Register. In In re In 
Over Our Heads, Inc., the TTAB stated that 
[b]ecause the guidelines [for determining whether a mark is disparaging] are 
somewhat vague and because the determination is so highly subjective, we 
are inclined to resolve doubts on the issue of whether a mark is scandalous or 
disparaging in favor of [the] applicant and pass the mark for publication with 
the knowledge that if a group does find the mark to be scandalous or 
disparaging, an opposition proceeding can be brought and a more complete 
record can be established.27 
 
24 Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). Other lesser-invoked bars to registration 
include marks that include the name, image, or signature of a living person without his consent, 
or the name, image, or signature of a deceased U.S. president “during the life of his widow.” 
Id. § 2(c), § 1052(c). 
25 Catherine P. Cain, Foreword to TMEP, supra note 2. 
26 TMEP, supra note 2, § 704.01. 
27 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654-55 (T.T.A.B. 1990). 
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The Federal Circuit reinforced this position in Ritchie v. Simpson, a case 
in which a member of the public challenged the registration of marks 
associated with O.J. Simpson under section 2(a).28 The court “commended” 
the PTO examiners’ deference towards publication and the policy of 
foregoing section 2(a) decisions until the opposition phase because these 
policies strike a balance between preserving the rights of mark owners and 
considering the public’s interest in preventing the registration, and thus the 
use, of scandalous or disparaging trademarks.29 The court stated that by 
having this policy of deference, “the PTO avoids the risk of pre-judging 
public attitudes toward a proposed registration based on ad hoc responses by 
government officials, while at the same time affording the affected public an 
opportunity to effectively participate in the question of whether the 
registration is proper.”30 
2. Actual Examination Procedures of the PTO 
Under the policies described above, examiners should be precluded from 
exercising their own judgment when the disparaging or scandalous nature of 
a mark is questionable or unclear. In light of changing attitudes towards 
language—both within the general public with regard to scandalous words 
and within individual groups with regard to terms that may disparage—
examining attorneys should exercise deference at the initial examination stage 
for section 2(a) determinations and allow opposition proceedings to capture 
the actual attitudes of the potentially scandalized public or disparaged 
group.31 However, analysis of the actual procedures undertaken by examiners 
reveals that deference is employed in name only, with examiners substituting 
their own discretionary judgment of scandalousness or disparagement for that 
of the public or disparaged group.32 
 
28 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
29 Id. at 1094. 
30 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
31 See Todd Anten, Note, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the 
Reappropriation of Slurs into Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 405-06 (2006) 
(“Recognizing that a mark, once published, may then be challenged by a third party in an inter 
partes proceeding, both the TTAB and courts have repeatedly warned examining attorneys not to 
substitute their own personal judgments for those of potential challengers. Even if an examiner 
comes across some evidence that a mark may disparage, the intrinsically subjective and speculative 
nature of disparagement analysis instructs the examiner to publish the mark, so long as the examiner 
has doubts.” (citations omitted)). 
32 See id. at 419-20 (“Despite this mandate [to resolve doubts regarding the disparaging nature 
of the mark in favor of the applicant], many examining attorneys refuse to register marks containing 
former slurs in the face of strong doubts.”); Lilit Voskanyan, Comment, The Trademark Principal 
Register as a Nonpublic Fornm [sic], 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1295, 1318 (2008) (“[A]lthough the 
registration system may be inclined towards inclusion, that stance itself does not eliminate the 
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a. Evidence Relied upon by Examiners 
Examiners have discretion as to what and how much evidence they rely 
upon when making a section 2(a) decision. Some merely use case law and 
TTAB precedent to support their arguments, while others cite multiple 
dictionary definitions, Internet sources, and prior applications.33 Furthermore, 
some examiners consider the mark in a vacuum without regard to the context 
in which it is used, while others take that context into account.34 These 
decisions are arbitrary because the PTO has provided no overarching policy 
regulating how applications are assessed under section 2(a).  
In addition, PTO examiners are permitted to rely on lower-quality, 
less-reliable information when determining whether a mark is scandalous or 
disparaging, such as dictionary definitions, Internet search evidence, and the 
mere context of the goods to which the marks are affixed. “No specific degree 
or amount of such evidence is required so long as the examining attorney is 
persuaded to publish the mark for opposition.”35 In the examination context, 
the PTO lacks the resources to assemble high-quality evidence, such as 
surveys, personal affidavits, petitions, and expert linguistic analysis, to assess 
the actual perception of the public (in a scandalousness assessment) or the 
perception of the allegedly disparaged group (in a disparagement 
assessment).36 Therefore, “the PTO tolerates such deficiencies and offers 
examiners conducting ex parte evaluations of disparagement wide discretion 
in selecting the materials that will guide their decisions,” while third-party 
challengers are expected to bring forth the high-quality information that the 
PTO claims it cannot obtain on its own to prove that a mark is scandalous or 
disparaging under section 2(a).37 
 
selective nature of the registration mechanism, much less transform the Register into one available 
for ‘general access.’”). 
33 See infra Part II for further analysis of the types of evidence relied upon by PTO examiners. 
34 See Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 8, at 479 (“Some examining attorneys have taken it 
upon themselves to do a more advanced investigation as to goods and services other than the ones 
included in the application. Other examining attorneys only consider the specimens in the application as 
an indication of goods and services; through different processes, different results arise.”). 
35 Jessica M. Kiser, How Dykes on Bikes Got It Right: Procedural Inequities Inherent in the 
Trademark Office’s Review of Disparaging Trademarks, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011). 
36 See In re Budge Mfg., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he PTO has limited facilities 
for acquiring evidence—it cannot, for example, be expected to conduct a survey of the marketplace 
or obtain consumer affidavits . . . .”). 
37 Anten, supra note 31, at 407 (“[C]ourts hold third parties who challenge the registrability of 
marks to a higher standard . . . .”). 
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b. Reliance upon Precedent 
Examiners are also not bound by previous decisions, even when an 
applicant seeks to register a mark similar to marks he or others have already 
registered. According to the TMEP, “Previous decisions by examining 
attorneys in approving other marks are without evidentiary value and are not 
binding on the agency or the Board.”38 Therefore, an examiner can exercise 
his discretion to deem a mark barred by section 2(a) even if marks containing 
the same or similar content were granted by other examiners. For example, 
in In re Watkins, the TTAB reviewed an examiner’s determination that the 
mark TWATTY GIRL was scandalous. Despite the fact that the PTO 
registered the applicant’s previous applications for the marks TWATTY and 
TWATTYTRAX without any section 2(a) objections, the TTAB noted that it 
was not bound by the applicant’s prior registrations.39 The analysis in Part II 
below also demonstrates examiners’ lack of regard for precedent; in many 
instances, the PTO selectively denies registrations for the same purportedly 
scandalous or disparaging word without regard for identical prior registrations.40 
c. Evidentiary Standards 
The section 2(a) evidentiary standards for both scandalousness and 
disparagement invite examiners to infuse their analyses with individual 
discretion. Each standard will be considered in turn. 
i. Scandalousness 
The Federal Circuit articulated the evidentiary standard for scandalousness 
that has been adopted by the PTO in In re Mavety Media Group Ltd.41 To find 
a mark scandalous, (1) the mark must be shocking to the sense of truth, 
decency, or propriety, or call out for condemnation; (2) the mark must be 
considered in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods or 
services in the application for registration; and (3) the mark must be 
scandalous to a substantial composite of the general public, as measured from 
the context of contemporary attitudes.42 The TMEP instructs examiners to 
provide evidence that supports a denial for scandalousness under this 
standard.43 An examiner may cite dictionaries, newspapers, and magazines as 
evidence, but he has the choice of what and how much evidence he supplies 
 
38 TMEP, supra note 2, § 1207.01(d)(vi). 
39 No. 76138675, 2005 WL 548042, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2005). 
40 See infra Part II. 
41 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
42 Id. at 1371. 
43 TMEP, supra note 2, § 1203.01. 
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in support of a section 2(a) scandalousness denial; the only restriction appears 
to be that he cannot rely solely on previous refusals.44 Case law and 
precedential TTAB decisions also do not clearly dictate the quantity or 
quality of evidence required to make a section 2(a) denial for 
scandalousness.45 Some precedent holds that dictionary evidence is sufficient 
to meet the burden of proving scandalousness, essentially rendering a mark 
scandalous per se based on its definition alone. For example, the Federal 
Circuit stated in In re Boulevard Entertainment, Inc. that when “the evidence 
shows that the mark has only one pertinent meaning, dictionary evidence 
alone can be sufficient to satisfy the PTO’s burden” of proving 
scandalousness.46 Other cases state, however, that definitional evidence, even 
when combined with evidence demonstrating that the public perceives the 
mark as scandalous or disparaging, is insufficient to support such a 
determination. For example, in In re Old Glory Condom Corp., the TTAB 
determined that the examiner’s reliance on news stories discussing citizens’ 
negative reactions to so-called inappropriate uses of the American flag was 
insufficient to justify her opinion that a pictorial mark depicting a condom-
shaped American flag was scandalous to a substantial portion of the general 
public.47 In that case, more evidence would be required to support a 
scandalousness determination, but it is unclear from the opinion how much 
more and what type of evidence would have been sufficient. 
However, one category of marks that the PTO has essentially deemed 
scandalous per se is marks that contain profanity. Although the TTAB has 
acknowledged that profane words can attain secondary, nonprofane 
meanings, it has also claimed that such words cannot lose their profane 
meanings entirely.48 These marks are dismissed as scandalous purely based 
 
44 Id. 
45 See Baird, supra note 8, at 774 (“The cases interpreting Section 2(a) are inconsistent with 
respect to what evidence is required as evidence before an examining attorney may reject a 
trademark registration application on the basis that the trademark consists of or comprises 
scandalous or immoral matter.”). 
46 334 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
47 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (“Precisely why this combination of 
images is scandalous the examining attorney fails to articulate. . . . We are not willing, based solely 
on the examining attorney’s opinion, the evidence of the reaction to the Madonna video, and the 
unsuccessful effort to amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit the burning of the flag, to presume 
that the flag imagery of applicant’s mark would give offense in a manner that must be deemed 
‘scandalous’ under Section 2(a).”). 
48 See In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (“[T]he fact that 
profane words may be uttered more freely does not render them any the less profane. Nor does this 
fact amend the statute by which we are required to determine the registrability of such matter as 
marks.”); Baird, supra note 8, at 718 (“Although the Board acknowledged that profane words may 
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on their profane dictionary definition without regard for contemporary 
evolution of meaning. In these instances, the examiners essentially act as 
arbiters of what they consider to be good taste by preventing allegedly 
profane words from obtaining the legitimacy and rights afforded to registered 
trademarks.49 However, determining what qualifies as “profane” is necessarily 
a subjective task because the scandalousness of the marks is supposed to be 
considered in light of contemporary attitudes as well as the marks’ contexts.50 
Examiners thus act within their own discretion to decide whether a word that 
has a definition that is on the border between profane and nonprofane is 
scandalous and therefore unregistrable. 
Examiners also receive little guidance as to what and how much evidence is 
necessary to demonstrate that a mark is scandalous to a “substantial composite 
of the general public.”51 Examiners can rely on the types of evidence 
articulated in the TMEP when making this assessment, but the sufficiency of 
evidence necessary to make a scandalousness claim is unclear from the 
examination materials. For example, “While there is established caselaw on 
courts’ consideration of marketing efforts or opinion surveys when evaluating 
other Lanham Act claims, such as false advertising or likelihood of confusion, 
nothing suggests that the TTAB looks to these cases for guidance.”52 Without 
clear standards for assessing and supporting a scandalousness determination, 
discretion is likely to enter the decisionmaking process, and with it the 
potential for examiners’ personal biases to cloud their supposed objectivity. 
ii. Disparagement 
The standards for disparagement under section 2(a) are even more 
uncertain. The TTAB’s decision in Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. (Harjo I) set 
forth the basic two-step inquiry for assessing disparagement: (1) determining 
the likely meaning of the matter in question, and (2) determining whether 
that meaning may be considered disparaging to a substantial composite of the 
 
acquire secondary, non-profane meanings over the course of time, it resisted the notion that a 
profane word could ever lose its profane meaning entirely.”). 
49 See Baird, supra note 8, at 718 (arguing that the PTO treats profane words as scandalous per 
se to avoid “encourag[ing] their use and accelerat[ing] their transformation into becoming acceptable 
jargon in the market place”). 
50 See id. at 717 (“[W]hile it may be easy to state that ‘profane’ words cannot ever be registered 
as trademarks, it is not as easy at the fringe to identify exactly which words and images are to be 
considered ‘profane.’ Indeed, . . . profanity is relative; it depends upon the viewpoints, values, and 
beliefs of the listener.”). 
51 In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
52 Regan Smith, Note, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and Disparaging 
Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 462 (2007). 
  
2016] Discriminatory Discretion 525 
 
relevant group.53 The TMEP has articulated this basic test to examiners as 
follows: “the examining attorney must make a prima facie showing that a 
substantial composite, although not necessarily a majority, of the referenced 
group would find the proposed mark, as used on or in connection with the 
relevant goods or services, to be disparaging in the context of contemporary 
attitudes.”54 With no specific evidentiary standard set forth in the Manual, 
the TTAB has analogized the standards for determining disparagement with 
those for determining scandalousness, even though the affected group is 
defined differently.55 In addition, no guidance is provided as to what types of 
evidence examiners should assess to determine disparagement, so examiners 
can only draw from the scandalousness context. This is problematic because 
dictionaries and news articles, for example, may not encompass what a 
“substantial composite” of the relevant group believes about the allegedly 
disparaging word or phrase, and do not take into account the context in which 
the word or phrase is used within the trademark. These “hazy” guidelines 
mean that “without the benefit of an actual member of the disparaged group 
coming forward to challenge the mark, an examiner’s assessment is akin to a 
prediction of how a particular group of people might conceivably react to the 
mark.”56 Such predictions are riddled with discretionary decisions that fail to 
defer to applicants before reaching the opposition phase, when members of the 
allegedly disparaged groups can come forward and voice their actual 
disapproval of the marks. 
II. AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2(A) DENIALS: WHAT IS ACTUALLY 
DEEMED SCANDALOUS OR DISPARAGING? 
A. Methodology 
To assess grants and denials of scandalous and disparaging trademarks 
under section 2(a), I selected words in each category that are traditionally 
included in these categories (e.g., profanity), have been the subject of public 
debate, or were the subject of previous section 2(a) cases that have reached 
the TTAB or the Federal Circuit. I searched for each word in the PTO’s 
 
53 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1740-41 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 284 F. Supp. 2d 
96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
54 TMEP, supra note 2, § 1203.03(b)(i). 
55 See Harjo I, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (“In seeking guidance for determining . . . whether 
matter may be perceived as disparaging, we look to the limited precedent of the courts and the 
[TTAB] on the issue of disparagement, as well as to the previously enunciated precedent on the 
related issue of scandalousness.”). 
56 Anten, supra note 31, at 406. 
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Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS)57 through the basic word mark 
search function. From the resulting list, I viewed each application’s 
prosecution history and documents on the Trademark Status and Document 
Retrieval (TSDR) database.58 TSDR documents relevant to my analysis 
included (1) the applicant’s initial application, which contains the 
identification of goods for which the mark is used as well as any visual 
representations of the mark; (2) Office Actions sent from the examining 
attorney to the applicant that request further information from the applicant 
and provide reasoning and supporting evidence for initial or final denials of 
registration; and (3) internal notations to the applicant’s files that indicate 
the examiner’s actions regarding the application, such as communications 
with the applicant or the examiner’s managing attorney. 
Applications that did not have the relevant documents uploaded to TSDR 
(generally, applications prior to the year 2000) were disregarded, as were 
applications for marks that did not contain the relevant word but nevertheless 
were included in the TESS search results for that word. 
From the TSDR documents, I assessed whether the mark was denied or 
approved for publication by the examining attorney.59 If the mark was 
approved, I determined whether the examiner raised a section 2(a) objection at 
any point during the examination process. If the mark was denied, I determined 
whether the denial was under section 2(a) or whether it was on other statutory 
or technical grounds. For any applications in which a section 2(a) objection was 
raised—regardless of whether the application was ultimately granted or denied 
by the examiner—I assessed whether the examiner relied on any evidence for 
his section 2(a) analysis, and if so, what types of evidence were presented. I 
also noted any anomalies based on the goods for which the mark was used, 
unusual uses of evidence, and any exchanges between the applicant and the 
examiner regarding a potential section 2(a) denial. 
B. Data and Analysis 
1. Marks Denied Under Section 2(a) 
In the scandalousness context, the most “vulgar” words were denied 
registration most frequently and most consistently, whereas less blatantly 
 
57 TESS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://tmsearch.uspto.gov [http://perma.cc/6ASD-
TJC9] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
58 TSDR, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://tsdr.uspto.gov [http://perma.cc/U62U-
HY8Q] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
59 Marks approved for publication do not always become registered on the Principal Register. 
My analysis only focuses on whether the mark was approved at the examination stage, regardless of 
whether it was ultimately registered. 
  
2016] Discriminatory Discretion 527 
 
offensive words (such as acronyms) were registered more often.60 “Fuck” and 
“asshole” received no registrations whatsoever, and 100% of the denials for 
“asshole” were made under section 2(a). Very few marks using “shit” were 
granted (2.83%), and 95.88% of “shit” denials were made under section 2(a). 
The “less offensive” words (“tits,” “slut,” and “piss”) were assessed more 
inconsistently, with 31.91% of “tits” applications (none of which faced a 
section 2(a) objection), 65.42% of “slut” applications, and 73.53% of “piss” 
applications successfully registered.  
Representing a vulgar word in an acronym did not insulate it from 
scandalousness denial, but this “rule” is inconsistently applied depending on 
the acronym in question. For example, compare “WTF” and “MILF,” which 
both include a letter that stands for the heavily denied word “fuck.” “WTF” 
received only one section 2(a) objection throughout all of the relevant 
applications (and the mark was ultimately registered). For “MILF,” on the 
other hand, two-thirds of all denials were made under section 2(a). 
Disparagement determinations were even more inconsistent, even for 
words with the same apparent meaning.61 For example, the words “heeb” and 
“hebe” are alternative spellings for a derogatory term directed towards Jewish 
people. All denials of “heeb” were made under section 2(a), while no denials 
of “hebe” were made for that reason.62 “Fag” and “faggot” were also treated 
inconsistently even though both words have the same disparaging meaning 
towards gay and lesbian individuals. All “faggot” applications were denied 
under section 2(a), whereas 62.96% of “fag” applications were registered (with 
only 18% over a section 2(a) objection). In addition, marks containing “queer,” 
another traditionally disparaging term for gay and lesbian individuals, received 
no section 2(a) denials or objections, though perhaps this is because “queer” 
has become a more accepted word by the gay community in light of 
touchstones in popular culture such as Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.63 
Although the term “redskin” has been the topic of controversy amid the 
current litigation surrounding the Washington Redskins trademarks,64 marks 
containing the term have not been consistently deemed disparaging. When 
considering “redskin” marks more generally, slightly more than 44% of those 
marks were successfully registered, and only 40% of denials were made under 
 
60 For a full list of the researched scandalous words and their rates of registration and denial 
with respect to section 2(a), see infra Appendix, Table 1. 
61 For a full list of the researched disparaging words and their rates of registration and denial 
with respect to section 2(a), see infra Appendix, Table 2. 
62 One “hebe” registration was made over a section 2(a) objection, making up 20% of all 
registrations for the word. 
63 (Bravo Original Production & Scout Productions 2003–07). 
64 See infra subsection V.D.1 (discussing the Redskins case in greater detail). 
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section 2(a)—despite the TTAB’s argument in the current cancellation 
proceedings that the word is disparaging per se, even where it has acquired 
secondary meaning (i.e., as the identifier of the professional football team).65 
Another derogatory term for Native Americans, “squaw,” has been registered 
significantly more often; 82.14% of applications were registered, and only 13% 
of those were over a section 2(a) objection. When assessing the mark, the 
examiners likely applied the geographic meaning of “squaw” rather than the 
disparaging meaning.66 However, this high success rate makes the “redskin” 
denials even more puzzling, as “redskin” has likely acquired a secondary 
meaning of identifying the professional football team that eclipses the word’s 
use as an ethnic slur. The selective application of secondary meaning in the 
context of disparaging marks indicates the PTO’s failure to implement clear 
standards for analyzing such marks under section 2(a), ultimately leading to 
arbitrary decisionmaking. 
2. Evidence Relied upon in Scandalousness and  
Disparagement Determinations 
In both the scandalousness and disparagement contexts, nearly all 
examiners rely on some kind of evidence. For scandalousness, most examiners 
rely on dictionary definitions that deem the word to be offensive, vulgar, 
profane, or scandalous to support a section 2(a) determination.67 In fact, for 
marks including the term “asshole” or “WTF,” all section 2(a) analyses were 
supported by dictionary definitions.68 Analyses that relied less heavily on 
dictionary definitions culled evidence from the Internet to support the 
scandalous definition of the mark in context. For example, only 45.45% of 
section 2(a) analyses for marks including “MILF” used dictionaries, but 100% 
used Internet sources.69 Common Internet sources included Wikipedia 
articles, Urban Dictionary and other crowd-sourced online slang dictionaries, 
and lists of Google search results showing the scandalous context of the terms. 
A few bold examiners also included screenshots of pornographic websites 
using the terms in question to support their denials. The use of Internet 
 
65 See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc. (Blackhorse I), 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1110 
(T.T.A.B. 2014), aff’d, No. 1:14-cv-01043-GBL-IDD, 2015 WL 4096277 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015), 
appeal filed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (“[Pro-Football’s] argument regarding ‘secondary 
meaning’ in the sense that it has ‘a secondary or alternate meaning’ denoting a football team, is not 
persuasive in that the ‘secondary meaning’ has not stripped the word ‘redskins’ of its ‘ethnic’ meaning.”). 
66 But see Richard Pérez-Peña, Tribes See Name on Oregon Maps as Being Out of Bounds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2015, at A16 (describing efforts by Native Americans in Oregon to remove the 
name “squaw” from official place names due to the term’s offensiveness). 
67 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
68 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
69 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
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sources in section 2(a) analyses appeared more prevalent for newer, less 
commonly used terms. These sources were also more commonly used to show 
that the mark is scandalous in context, whereas dictionary definitions were 
used to show that a word is scandalous by definition regardless of context. In 
addition, scandalousness determinations were unlikely to use other denials as 
evidence, reflecting the TMEP’s mandate requiring individual consideration 
of each application. However, a few examiners disregarded this rule and used 
other denial evidence to support their adverse determinations (9.57% of 
“shit”; 13.33% of “asshole”; 4.50% of “fuck”; and 4.35% of “tits”).70 
Similarly, disparagement determinations primarily relied on dictionary 
evidence. For seven out of the thirteen terms analyzed, 100% of section 2(a) 
denials relied on dictionary evidence.71 This is problematic, however, because 
disparagement must be determined by the perceptions of a substantial 
composite of the allegedly disparaged group. By relying on general purpose 
dictionaries, these examiners account for the attitudes of the public as a whole 
but not the relevant group specifically. This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that the allegedly disparaged groups tend to be minorities whose opinions 
may not be reflected by those of the general public. Significantly fewer 
decisions were supported by evidence showing the opinions of actual group 
members, such as surveys or statements by representative organizations. 
Although 100% of “redskin” denials under section 2(a) supplied this type of 
evidence (likely because it was on file from the original cancellation case), 
only denials concerning the terms “slant” (50%), “dyke” (16.67%), and “squaw” 
(83.33%) included this type of evidence at all.72 The majority of these 
decisions, therefore, are not supported by evidence that a substantial 
composite of the relevant group finds the word disparaging. Rather, these 
denials appear to be supported by general assumptions of disparagement by 
the public or merely by the lone examiner who makes the decision. 
3. Anomalies 
Certain grants and denials of trademark registration stand out as 
anomalous given their inconsistency with the general treatment of the word 
at issue, indicating arbitrariness within the review process. For example, the 
word “shit” as used in a trademark has been denied in nearly 98% of cases, 
almost 96% of which were for scandalousness under section 2(a).73 One mark 
was granted over an initial section 2(a) objection, however. The mark 
 
70 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
71 See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
72 See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
73 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
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DEMSHITZ has been a registered mark on the Principal Register since April 
2012. Its prosecution history indicates that a section 2(a) objection was raised 
on July 27, 2009, but was withdrawn on July 29, 2009.74 The remainder of the 
mark’s prosecution history rests on the misclassification of goods and services 
for which the mark was registered. Once the applicants reclassified their 
goods, however, the registration was granted without objection. The only 
evidence of the examiner’s reason for reconsideration is a checklist document, 
titled Note to the File, indicating that the examiner “discussed 2(a) with [his] 
senior.”75 This sudden change is especially perplexing given that the TTAB 
has essentially held that the word “bullshit” is scandalous per se.76 
The considerations of other scandalous words also illustrate inconsistent 
decisionmaking. For example, the trademark TIT MOUSE, as applied to a 
computer mouse shaped like a woman’s breast, was approved for publication 
without section 2(a) objection.77 Conversely, the mark TITMOUSE was 
denied as scandalous under section 2(a) as applied to a nearly identical 
product.78 Further, an examiner denied a mark as scandalous for containing 
the term “Sugar Tit,” even though the mark owner argued that the term was 
referring to the real town of Sugar Tit, South Carolina—a legitimate 
argument, as “South Carolina Moonshine” and “Sweetest Shine In the 
South” were also included as part of the applied-for mark.79 
 
74 See DEMSHITZ, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/721,974 (filed Apr. 24, 2009), 
Office Action Outgoing, July 27, 2009, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77721974& 
docId=OOA20090727151445#docIndex=26&page=1 [http://perma.cc/2N99-MQJA] (denying 
registration “because the applied-for mark [consisted] of or [comprised] immoral or scandalous 
matter”); DEMSHITZ, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/721,974 (filed Apr. 24, 2009), 
Office Action Outgoing, July 29, 2009, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77721974 
&docId=OOA20090729203800#docIndex=23&page=1 [http://perma.cc/R8MM-35JA] (withdrawing 
the section 2(a) denial upon subsequent review and instructing the applicant to correctly classify the 
goods and services). 
75 DEMSHITZ, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/721,974 (filed Apr. 24, 2009), Note to the 
File, July 29, 2009, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77721974&docId=NTS20090729 
203313#docIndex=24&page=1 [http://perma.cc/WQ7E-V4CQ]. 
76 See In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (denying 
registration to the trademark BULLSHIT as applied to a line of handbags despite having “acquired 
a secondary, non-profane meaning” and society’s more frequent use of profanities). 
77 TIT MOUSE, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/006,367 (filed May 1, 2000), 
Notice of Publication Under 12(a), Jan. 22, 2003, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn 
78006367&docId=NOP20030122160236#docIndex=2&page=1 [http://perma.cc/GPY4-TDXY]. 
78 See TITMOUSE, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/954,967 (filed Aug. 18, 2006), 
Office Action Outgoing, Jan. 20, 2007, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn789 
54967&docId=OOA20070120082345#docIndex=1&page=1 [http://perma.cc/Y4YE-7NKP] (denying 
registration in part because “tit” is “vulgar slang” for a woman’s breast). 
79 See SWEETEST SHINE IN THE SOUTH SUGAR TIT MOONSHINE, U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 86/335,465 (filed July 12, 2014), Office Action Outgoing, Dec. 13, 
2014, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn86335465&docId=OOA20141213103708#doc 
  
2016] Discriminatory Discretion 531 
 
The TSDR records also provide insufficient information to support 
decisions to drop section 2(a) objections originally made by the examining 
attorneys. As in the DEMSHITZ registration, two refusals of marks 
containing “MILF” were later reversed after initial section 2(a) denials. The 
only evidence supporting those reversals are notations to each application’s 
file that state “[s]ubsequent consultation with Managing Attorney; 2(a) refusal 
withdrawn.”80 Two applications containing “slut” that were ultimately 
registered without official section 2(a) objections contain similarly cryptic 
notes, stating that 2(a) was discussed with the examiner’s managing attorney 
but no action was ultimately taken.81 
The disparagement context presents similarly anomalous decisions. For 
example, two “redskin” marks were granted as applied to food products, 
whereas one that was also applied to food products was denied as 
disparaging.82 Another mark for WASHINGTON REDSKIN POTATOES 
(as applied to clothing products, perhaps parodying the football team) was 
denied under section 2(a) even though the mark itself refers to potatoes with 
red skins rather than Native Americans (as in the aforementioned granted 
marks for food products).83 
Reappropriation of marks by group members is also treated inconsistently. 
Marks for MARRIAGE IS FOR FAGS, an apparent reappropriation in 
support of gay marriage, and POCKETFAG.COM, an explicit reappropriation, 
according to a response by the mark owner, were both denied registration 
 
Index=2&page=1 [http://perma.cc/3QAG-BX7D] (denying registration due to the scandalous term 
in the mark and requiring a new drawing and amended disclaimer). 
80 DIARY OF A MILF, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/885,837 (filed May 17, 
2006), Note to the File, Feb. 12, 2008, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78885837& 
docId=NTS20080212173433#docIndex=7&page=1 [http://perma.cc/C3RM-8MUP]. 
81 See, e.g., TOKYO STREET SLUTS, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/506,930 
(filed Oct. 27, 2004), Note to the File, June 11, 2005, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId 
=sn78506930&docId=NTS20050613054610#page=1 [http://perma.cc/EX94-JWFZ]. 
82 Compare REDSKIN, Registration No. 2,183,639 (registering on Aug. 25, 1998 a mark for 
“REDSKIN” as applied to “canned beans”), and ALL NATURAL MY DADZ NUTZ 
CARMELIZED JUMBO REDSKINS, Registration No. 3,792,438 (registering on May 25, 2010 
the mark as applied to “nut-based snack foods”), with REDSKIN HOG RINDS, U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 86/052,159 (filed Aug. 30, 2013), Office Action Outgoing, Dec. 29, 2013, 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn86052159&docId=OOA20131229163025#docIndex
=1&page=1 [http://perma.cc/T6MH-2ZUD] (denying a mark for REDSKIN HOG RINDS as 
applied to pork rinds). 
83 See WASHINGTON REDSKIN POTATOES, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
86/092,137 (filed Oct. 15, 2013), Office Action Outgoing, Mar. 17, 2014, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/ 
documentviewer?caseId=sn86092137&docId=OOA20140317163638#docIndex=4&page=1 [http://per 
ma.cc/4VKE-GJ4H] (“Although the use of ‘redskin’ with potatoes may often have a different 
connotation, in the context of applicant’s mark that includes ‘WASHINGTON’ and is used in 
connection with football-related goods and services, the connotation is disparaging.”). 
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notwithstanding a demonstration by group members that the mark was not 
disparaging because it was being reclaimed by the disparaged group.84 However, 
a mark for F.A.G. FABULOUS AND GAY, another apparent reappropriation 
of the term “fag” made to positively apply to gay individuals, was registered 
without any section 2(a) objection.85 This disparate treatment of terms deemed 
disparaging in certain contexts demonstrates a lack of clear standards for 
dealing with terms that have been reappropriated or have alternative 
meanings, potentially leading to discrimination by examining attorneys who 
can deny marks without having to take these considerations into account. 
III. EFFECTS OF TRADEMARK DENIAL OR CANCELLATION 
Building on the reasons (or lack thereof) for denying trademark 
registration under section 2(a), this Part addresses the effects of such denials 
on the rights and expression of mark owners. The PTO and the courts have 
flatly dismissed the proposition that section 2(a) violates the First 
Amendment, because denying registration does not actually deny use. In In 
re McGinley, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to 
the Federal Circuit) succinctly held that 
[w]ith respect to appellant’s First Amendment rights, it is clear that the 
PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right to use it. 
No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed. 
Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by 
the refusal to register his mark.86 
Since In re McGinley, opinions from the TTAB and the Federal Circuit 
dealing with section 2(a) merely cite to this general proposition without 
questioning or further analysis.87 A trademark that is not registered on the 
 
84 See PF POCKETFAG.COM YOU, ONLY SMALLER, U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 77/768,836 (filed June 26, 2009), Office Action Outgoing, Nov. 6, 2009, 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77768836&docId=OOA20091106164321#docIndex=1
&page=1 [http://perma.cc/WF34-DFZ2] (denying registration of POCKETFAG.COM for section 
2(a) disparagement); MARRIAGE IS FOR FAGS, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77/477,549 (filed May 19, 2008), Office Action Outgoing, Nov. 19, 2008, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/doc 
umentviewer?caseId=sn77477549&docId=OOA20081119155223#docIndex=1&page=1 [http://perma.cc/ 
5UDZ-UL4K] (denying registration of MARRIAGE IS FOR FAGS for section 2(a) disparagement). 
85 See F.A.G. FABULOUS AND GAY, Registration No. 2,997,761 (registering on September 
20, 2005 the mark F.A.G. FABULOUS AND GAY). 
86 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (internal citations omitted). 
87 See Voskanyan, supra note 32, at 1302 (summarizing the Federal Circuit’s “terse” reliance on 
McGinley in subsequent constitutional challenges to section 2(a)).The Federal Circuit officially 
overturned McGinley in its en banc opinion in In re Tam (Tam III), No. 14-1203, slip op. (Fed. Cir. 
Dec. 22, 2015). The effect of this reversal on section 2(a) policies and procedures has yet to be seen, 
however. This Comment will therefore focus on the McGinley-era standards. 
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Principal Register does still receive common law protections against 
infringement, as set forth in Lanham Act section 43(a).88 However, 
registration confers such significant benefits89 unto mark owners that failure 
to obtain registration imposes a significant burden. Rather than risk a denial 
under section 2(a), the mark owner will likely succumb to pressure either to 
change the mark such that it is not scandalous or disparaging or abandon it 
altogether. As I will demonstrate in Part V, this pressure results in viewpoint 
discrimination that violates the First Amendment. 
A. Statutory Benefits of Registration 
McCarthy90 recognizes seven key protections for registered marks 
embedded within the Lanham Act: (1) “[f]ederal jurisdiction for 
infringement without the necessity of any required amount in controversy”;91 
(2) available recovery of profits, costs, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees;92 
(3) registration as prima facie evidence of the mark’s validity and the registrant’s 
ownership, exclusive right to use, and actual use of the mark in interstate 
commerce; 93 (4) incontestability after five years of continuous use of the 
registered mark, providing conclusive evidence of the registrant’s ownership 
and exclusive right to use the mark;94 (5) constructive notice of the 
registrant’s ownership and exclusive right, “so as to eliminate any defense of 
good faith adoption and use made after the date of registration”;95 (6) a 
“constructive use date” for the mark as of the registrant’s filing date for the 
application (for marks that were not used in commerce prior to 
registration);96 and (7) protection against importation into the United States 
of foreign goods bearing an infringing mark.97 In addition, the registrant 
gains “access to federal courts where there is a presumption of validity of the 
registration (e.g., that the mark is not immoral or scandalous).”98 The 
McGinley court also recognized that the registrant receives some “direct 
 
88 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 25 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing a civil action as recourse for 
“any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by another’s use of a mark in 
commerce that is likely to cause confusion as to origin or sponsorship with the original person’s 
mark, whether or not it is registered). 
89 These benefits will be discussed infra Section III.A. 
90 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 19:9. 
91 Id. (citing Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012)). 
92 Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). 
93 Id. § 7(b), § 1057(b); id. § 33(a), § 1115(a). 
94 Id. § 15, § 1065; id. § 33(b), § 1115(b). 
95 Id. § 22, § 1072; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 19:9. 
96 Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012). 
97 Id. § 42, § 1124. 
98 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (emphasis omitted). 
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government protection of the mark” because the PTO examiners refuse 
registration to subsequent applications that conflict with marks registered on 
the Principal Register.99 All of these benefits are conferred by the PTO, and 
therefore by the federal government, so decisions regarding these benefits are 
governed by the Constitution as well as by the relevant statutes. 
B. Burdens on the Trademark Owner 
Even though lack of registration does not directly limit the right to use a 
trademark, it imposes significant burdens on the trademark owner. Primarily, 
an unregistered trademark does not receive the aforementioned statutory 
benefits of registration, which limits the mark owner’s ability to defend his 
mark against infringement and dilution. A mark denied registration under 
section 2(a) may also lose the common law protections against infringement and 
dilution set forth in section 43, although courts have not definitively ruled on 
this theory.100 Additionally, marks denied under section 2(a) likely cannot 
receive state-level trademark protection because most state trademark statutes 
have a provision that mirrors section 2(a).101 If a mark is deemed “unregistrable” 
and therefore not subject to any legal protection against infringement, the 
trademark loses all of its economic value because a mark that can be copied 
without consequence cannot serve as a reliable indicator of source.102 
Without the statutory protections of registration, a trademark also loses 
its expressive value. When the mark is not economically viable, any identity 
or association that the mark owner has imputed to the mark is lost because it 
cannot be communicated to and shared with the public. The TTAB 
acknowledged this problem in In re McGinley, stating that “denial of 
 
99 Id. 
100 See In re Tam (Tam II), 785 F.3d 567, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 
600 F. App’x 775 (mem.) (per curiam) (Fed. Cir. 2015) (arguing that trademarks denied under 
section 2(a) cannot receive common law protection under section 43 because such protection “is only 
available for unregistered trademarks that could have qualified for federal registration”); Michelle B. 
Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness 
Gone Too Far? 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 65, 69 (1997) (“[I]t is . . . unlikely that a trademark owner whose 
mark has been canceled under section 2(a) will be able to avail himself of any of the protections 
generally provided to the owners of unregistered trademarks, specifically those provided by section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, state statute, or common law. No court has found that disparaging marks 
would be denied protection under section 43(a), but commentators have cited public policy reasons, 
which distinguish between unregistered and unregisterable marks, to say that it is likely such 
protection will be denied.” (footnotes omitted)). 
101 See Tam II, 785 F.3d at 577 (describing section 2 of the Model State Trademark Act, which 
mirrors the bars to registration contained in Lanham Act section 2). 
102 Lee, supra note 100, at 78 (“If this exclusivity is, for all intents and purposes, taken away by 
the prohibition of registering under section 2(a) and the resulting loss of state and common law 
rights, the property right in the trademark is essentially being destroyed. It is no longer 
economically viable.”). 
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registration will not affect [the] applicant’s continued use of his mark, but 
such use . . . will be visible only to those who share applicant’s interest and 
will be without the implied approval and the statutory benefits that would 
result from [f]ederal registrations.”103 Even though the TTAB and courts 
have expressly disclaimed that registration constitutes a “government 
imprimatur” approving a mark’s content,104 an applicant whose mark is 
denied may still perceive that the government has deemed the mark 
inappropriate for government protection. Losing the government’s 
perceived approval through a section 2(a) denial therefore can cause a loss of 
the “intangible psychological benefits” that arise from such approval.105 For 
marks deemed disparaging that nonetheless have been reclaimed by the 
disparaged group, the loss of government approval is especially problematic. 
One commentator argues that “[s]uch . . . rejection not only precludes the 
applicant from acquiring federal benefits for that mark, but also impedes the 
applicant’s power to construct a chosen identity.”106  
Therefore, denial of registration burdens mark owners economically, 
expressively, and psychologically, so the PTO should carefully consider these 
impacts when denying marks under section 2(a). However, the PTO appears 
to make these decisions arbitrarily, with limited opportunity for mark owners 
to contest and overcome them. These decisions deny applicants the benefits 
of registration, limiting their ability to use the marks and thus their ability to 
express the message behind those marks—potentially infringing First 
Amendment rights. 
IV. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”107 Government-sponsored 
discrimination against speech on the basis of the viewpoint expressed therein 
abridges this freedom at its most basic level, and courts have deemed 
viewpoint discrimination by the government as one of the most egregious 
violations of the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court stated in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, “above all else, the First Amendment means 
 
103 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 756 (T.T.A.B. 1979), aff’d, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
104 See, e.g., In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 
1993) (“[W]e have detected an undercurrent of concern that the issuance of a trademark registration 
for applicant’s mark amounts to the awarding of the U.S. Government’s ‘imprimatur’ to the mark. 
Such a notion is, of course, erroneous.”). 
105 Anten, supra note 31, at 397. 
106 Id. at 423. 
107 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”108 Thus, the government generally 
cannot discriminate against speech on the basis of the viewpoint it expresses. 
This idea stems from the United States’ “profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well [be] vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp.”109 Laws that discriminate against speech on the basis of 
viewpoint violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, laws that do not 
explicitly provide for viewpoint discrimination but rather indirectly permit 
it through the discretion afforded to the laws’ enforcers also violate the First 
Amendment.110 Section 2(a) falls into this category both because of its facial 
restriction on certain types of trademarks based on what they express, and 
also because the discretion provided to trademark examiners allows them to 
deny the benefits of trademark registration based on the viewpoints contained 
within applied-for marks. 
A. Content- and Viewpoint-Based Restrictions 
Content and viewpoint discrimination are related concepts, as both deal 
with restrictions on speech based on the content of the speech itself. In both 
instances, “[t]he First Amendment does not permit [the government] to 
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on 
disfavored subjects.”111 Since content-based restrictions bear a strong risk of 
discriminating against particular speakers (as opposed to content-neutral 
restrictions, which restrict all forms of speech), they are reviewed under strict 
constitutional scrutiny and are presumptively invalid.112 Few content-based 
restrictions pass constitutional muster, and those that do are within 
historically defined categories of speech that are “of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
 
108 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
109 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1969). 
110 See infra notes 118–40 and accompanying text. 
111 R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding an ordinance prohibiting bias-
motivated disorderly conduct went beyond the permissible restriction of “fighting words” and was 
therefore facially invalid as a content-based restriction on speech). 
112 Id. at 382. 
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outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”113 Mere 
“offensiveness” is not a basis for denying speech on the basis of its content.114  
Viewpoint discrimination, then, is a subset of content discrimination that 
is viewed as an even more serious First Amendment violation. As Justice 
Kennedy expressed in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 
When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken 
by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more 
blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content 
discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when 
the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker 
is the rationale for the restriction.115 
Viewpoint-based restrictions therefore limit speech on the basis of its 
underlying ideas rather than just the content of the speech itself. Government 
restrictions on viewpoint are particularly egregious because they may distort 
the marketplace of ideas (and, in the case of commercial speech, the 
commercial marketplace) by preventing the expression of certain disfavored 
points of view.116 
B. Official Discretion and the First Amendment 
Excessive discretion stemming from unclear or standardless administrative 
guidelines can lead to First Amendment violations when administrators restrict 
certain speech on the basis of its content or viewpoint. One commentator 
argues that this discretion can result in discrimination that violates the First 
Amendment in two ways: first, by targeting speech on the basis of the ideas 
it conveys, and second, by targeting speakers on the basis of their inherent 
 
113 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). These categories include inciting 
lawless action, obscenity, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and 
“speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has power to prevent.” United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). Note that these classifications do not include speech 
that is scandalous or disparaging, the content proscribed by section 2(a). 
114 See Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108 
(1991) (“[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing 
it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according 
it constitutional protection.” (citations omitted)). 
115 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing R. A. V., 505 U.S. at 391). 
116 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Government action that 
stifles speech on account of its message . . . pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not 
to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or 
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”). 
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characteristics.117 Such discriminatory discretion constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination because “viewpoint neutrality requires not just that a government 
refrain from explicit viewpoint discrimination, but also that it provide adequate 
safeguards to protect against the improper exclusion of viewpoints.”118 Without 
specific procedures in place for implementing laws in a non-exclusionary 
manner, bureaucratic discretion can directly contravene the First Amendment 
by excluding speech on the basis of the viewpoint it expresses. 
As such, “The Supreme Court has long recognized that vesting excessive 
discretion to regulate speech in the hands of public officials can be destructive 
to the equality that the First Amendment demands.”119 In Shuttlesworth v. City 
of Birmingham, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that provided 
the Birmingham City Commission with “virtually unbridled and absolute 
power to prohibit any ‘parade,’ ‘procession,’ or ‘demonstration’ on the city’s 
streets or public ways.”120 The officials in Shuttlesworth were to be guided only 
by “their own ideas of ‘public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good 
order, morals or convenience.’”121 Although the law requiring a license for 
parades was neutral on its face, the discretion left to officials allowed them to 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint—specifically, against organizers of 
civil rights demonstrations. Relying on thirty years of First Amendment 
precedent, the Court determined that subjecting lawful speech to prior 
restraints—i.e., preventing peaceful demonstrations by denying licenses to 
protestors—is unconstitutional absent “narrow, objective, and definite 
standards to guide the licensing authority” in implementing the law in a 
neutral manner without regard to the content or viewpoint to be expressed 
by the speakers.122 Such prior restraints effectively lead to self-censorship 
because the threat of unbridled discretion can “intimidate[] parties into 
censoring their own speech” if they believe it will be censored by the 
government based on what it expresses.123 Speech cannot be curbed by the 
 
117 See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and 
Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2416 (2003) (“From a constitutional standpoint, two . . . 
considerations warrant special attention. The first is that public officials may misuse their discretion 
either to target speech based on the messages or ideas sought to be conveyed. The second is that official 
decisionmakers may misuse their discretion to discriminate based on race or ethnicity.”). 
118 Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Sch., 457 F.3d 376, 
384 (4th Cir. 2006). 
119 Tokaji, supra note 117, at 2429-30. 
120 394 U.S. 147, 150 (1969). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 151. 
123 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988); see also Thornhill 
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (“It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the 
pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.”). 
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“uncontrolled will of an official,”124 so procedural safeguards must be in place 
to prevent the exercise of this will in a discriminatory manner.125 
The Court has carried this reasoning into the commercial speech context 
as well. In Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the Court struck down a city ordinance 
that gave the mayor unbridled authority to grant or deny permits for 
newsracks.126 The mayor needed to justify such denials with only a brief 
statement that granting a permit was not in the public interest.127 While 
newspapers are commercial entities, they are also in the “business of 
expression.”128 Therefore, viewpoints can affect discretionary licensing 
decisions made without the guidance of neutral standards. Such covert 
decisions ensure that “speakers denied a license will have no way of proving 
that the decision was unconstitutionally motivated, and, faced with that 
prospect, they will be pressured to conform their speech to the licensor’s 
unreviewable preference.”129 Such a situation would comprise an 
unconstitutional restraint on expression in both the commercial and 
noncommercial contexts.  
The application of this First Amendment tenet to commercial speech was 
clarified further in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. There, the 
Court found that a law disallowing the distribution of commercial handbills 
through newsracks violated the First Amendment by failing to establish any 
adequate distinction between restricted “commercial” publications and non-
restricted “expressive” publications.130 The law’s proffered distinction was 
unjustified except for the “naked assertion that commercial speech has ‘low 
value,’” an inherently content-based judgment.131 Therefore, officials could 
not constitutionally be vested with the discretion to determine whether a 
particular publication was commercial or noncommercial because the speech 
was protected regardless of its classification.132 
 
124 Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151. 
125 See Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. at 758 (“Standards provide the guideposts that 
check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is 
discriminating against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the 
licensing official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy . . . .”). 
126 Id. at 772. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 761. 
129 Id. at 760. 
130 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993). 
131 Id. at 429. 
132 Id.; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l 
Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 361-62 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant’s advertising policy 
prohibiting “controversial” advertisements was unconstitutionally overbroad because its application 
presented a “very real and substantial” danger that the defendant would exclude a proposed 
advertisement solely because of its expressed viewpoint). 
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What safeguards, then, are required to prevent an official from enforcing a 
discretionary law in a discriminatory manner? The Court summarized the standard 
for such safeguards in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, stating that 
a government regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently 
inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such 
discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular 
point of view. To curtail that risk, a law subjecting the exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, 
objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority. The 
reasoning is simple: If the permit scheme involves appraisal of facts, the 
exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion by the licensing 
authority, the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First 
Amendment freedoms is too great to be permitted.133 
Applying these tenets, the Forsyth Court struck down an ordinance that 
allowed administrators to decide how much to charge demonstrators for 
police protection because neither the ordinance nor the county’s practice 
provided standards to guide the administrator’s decision and did not require 
him to rely on objective evidence or provide an explanation.134 Therefore, 
“[n]othing in the law or its application prevent[ed] the official from 
encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary 
application of fees.”135 In Thomas v. Chicago Park District, however, the Court 
articulated the framework as requiring “adequate standards to guide the 
official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.”136 There, 
the Court upheld a licensing ordinance because the administrator could deny 
a license only for certain enumerated reasons137 and had to provide a clear 
explanation for the denial in writing.138 Moreover, higher-level 
administrators and state courts could review any decisions made under the 
law.139 Under this standard, laws must provide “reasonably specific and 
objective”140 criteria that sufficiently cabin the exercise of discretion to ensure 
that the laws are applied in a content- and viewpoint-neutral manner in 
accordance with the First Amendment. 
 
133 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992) (citations omitted). 
134 Id. at 133. 
135 Id. 
136 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002). 
137 Id. at 318 n.1. 
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C. Commercial Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly analyzed trademarks under 
its commercial-speech framework, it has interpreted trade names in a similar 
manner.141 “Because a trademark identifies the source of a product or service 
for users, it is protected commercial speech.”142 Since trademarks are classified 
as protected commercial speech, this Section will discuss the courts’ doctrines 
of commercial speech and how they intersect with viewpoint discrimination.143 
Commercial speech receives protection under the First Amendment, 
albeit less than the protection given to political speech. In Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Supreme Court 
first articulated that “speech which does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction” is protected by the First Amendment.144 Justice Blackmun 
qualified this protection by stating that the government could restrict 
commercial speech if it contains false or misleading content.145 Therefore, 
unlike other content-based restrictions (such as those on political speech), 
content-based restrictions on commercial speech are not presumptively 
invalid, and are subject to less-demanding First Amendment scrutiny. The 
Court further clarified the First Amendment analysis of commercial speech 
in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New 
York by setting forth a four-part test for assessing the constitutionality of 
restrictions on commercial speech: 
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield pos-
itive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.146 
Without a presumption of invalidity, this “intermediate” scrutiny test 
arguably restricts more commercial speech than is restricted under the strict 
 
141 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (“The use of trade names in connection with 
optometrical practice, then, is a form of commercial speech . . . .”). 
142 Tam II, 785 F.3d 567, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse 
(Blackhorse II), No. 1:14-cv-01043-GBL-IDD, 2015 WL 4096277, at *11 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015) 
(determining that while trademarks themselves are commercial speech, trademark registrations on 
the Principal Register are not commercial speech).  
143 Trademarks are not purely commercial speech, however, because they are also expressive 
speech. The dual speech functions of trademarks will be explored infra Section IV.D. 
144 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
145 Id. at 771-72. 
146 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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scrutiny test for political speech. However, the Court has recognized that a 
“consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far 
keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.”147 Therefore, 
commercial speech has received increasing protection in the years since Central 
Hudson. Although the protection is not yet exactly on par with that afforded to 
noncommercial speech, the gap between the two has narrowed considerably.148 
Importantly, even though commercial speech is arguably less protected 
than other types of speech, content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on 
commercial speech are still greatly limited by the First Amendment. In Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc., the Court struck down a Vermont regulation that 
restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmaceutical records because 
exceptions contained within the law expressly disfavored marketing speech 
(a type of commercial speech) and speech made by pharmaceutical marketing 
representatives.149 The Court held that this regulation, although applicable 
only to commercial speech, was improper under the First Amendment 
because it clearly targeted particular speech and speakers that “convey[ed] 
messages that are often in conflict with the goals of the state.”150 Furthermore, 
even if a restriction on commercial speech appears neutral on its face, a 
“purpose to suppress speech and its unjustified burdens on expression would 
render it unconstitutional.”151 
In addition, under Central Hudson, courts have determined that the 
government does not have a substantial interest in preventing offensive 
speech, which means commercial speech cannot be regulated on the basis of 
offensive content. The Supreme Court has expressly held that offensive 
content, so long as obscenity is not involved, does not provide a legitimate 
reason for suppressing noncommercial speech.152 As applied to commercial 
speech, this reasoning still holds because suppressing offensive content strikes 
at the ideas and viewpoints expressed by the speech rather than its 
commercial content.153 Although the Supreme Court has applied this 
standard to sexual content (i.e., content that could be deemed “scandalous”), 
lower courts have applied it to “disparaging” content in commercial speech 
as well. For example, the Sixth Circuit, relying on the above standards for 
 
147 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977). 
148 See Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone 
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 68 (2007) (“While it would be incorrect to 
suggest that commercial speech is today deemed fungible with fully protected speech in all contexts, it 
is at least true that the gap between the two is far narrower than it was in 1976.” (footnote omitted)). 
149 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 2664. 
152 Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977). 
153 Id. at 701 n.28; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983). 
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offensiveness, held that the use of the name “Sambo’s” for a restaurant is 
protected commercial speech even though the name may offend some African 
Americans.154 In light of the speaker’s First Amendment protections, the 
Sambo’s court determined that the offensive commercial speech needed to be 
an “intolerable” violation of citizens’ “substantial privacy interests” to justify 
its restriction.155 In Sambo’s, this simply could not be demonstrated. 
Regardless of the commercial or noncommercial nature of speech, case law 
demonstrates that speech cannot be restricted solely on the basis of offensive 
expression.156 In the “Additional Views” section of her opinion in Tam II, 
Judge Moore asserted that section 2(a)’s prohibitions cannot withstand 
Central Hudson scrutiny for precisely that reason—discouraging the use of 
marks that may offend cannot be a legitimate government interest, no matter 
how scandalous or disparaging they are perceived to be.157 
D. Section 2(a) as a Restriction on Viewpoint 
In light of the standards articulated by courts when assessing viewpoint-
based restrictions on speech in commercial and noncommercial contexts, 
section 2(a)’s restriction on scandalous and disparaging trademarks is clearly 
a viewpoint-based regulation that restricts both the economic and expressive 
functions of trademarks. Even though section 2(a) does not wholly restrict 
the use of these marks, preventing their registration based on the viewpoints they 
express heavily disincentivizes their use.158 Such “indirect discouragements” 
towards using potentially scandalous and disparaging trademarks “undoubtedly 
have [a] coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.”159 By 
denying the benefits of the Principal Register, this coercion creates a financial 
 
154 Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 693-95 (6th Cir. 1981). 
155 Id. at 695 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
156 See also Jeffery Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Redskins?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 665, 685-86 (2000) (“[A] government interest in ‘stamping out’ offensive matter is 
prima facie violative of the First Amendment, particularly when the offensive matter is specified by 
categories such as race or religion. Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly and unequivocally 
rejected the contention that suppression of offensive speech is a legitimate goal of commercial speech 
regulation.” (citations omitted)). 
157 Tam II, 785 F.3d 567, 583 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Judge Moore also argues that section 2(a) cannot 
be justified by an asserted government interest in controlling government speech or the use of 
federal time and funds, because trademarks are wholly private speech and the trademark system is 
funded entirely by trademark registrants. Id. 
158 See id. at 576 (“In effect, § 2(a) of the Lanham Act conditions trademark registration and 
all of its attendant benefits on the applicant’s selection of a suitable mark. . . . [Section] 2(a) allows the 
PTO to determine whether the trademark is suitable for registration . . . which is a moral judgment 
based solely and indisputably on the mark’s expressive content.”); see also supra notes 100–01 and 
accompanying text (discussing Tam II in greater detail). 
159 Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950). 
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incentive for mark owners to stop using marks denied under section 2(a), thus 
unconstitutionally curbing expression of the mark itself. Such a limit restricts 
speech based on the viewpoint it expresses and restricts speech related to the 
mark through its economic function as an indicator of source.160 
Section 2(a) also serves as a noncommercial restriction on viewpoint by 
restricting the expressive function of trademarks. Trademarks have 
extraneous meaning aside from their source-indicative qualities, including 
communicating associations with particular lifestyles, values, ideas, and 
viewpoints.161 These expressions can include ideas that are offensive to the 
general public or to particular groups of people. Although these expressions are 
curbed by section 2(a) denials, they are protected by the First Amendment’s 
viewpoint discrimination doctrine regardless of the level of public support they 
enjoy. Furthermore, section 2(a) serves as a viewpoint-based restriction in the 
context of disparaging marks. The statute does not restrict all expressive marks 
that relate to particular groups of people; instead, it only restricts marks that 
disparage while allowing marks that praise. Although limiting intergroup 
animosity is a laudable goal, it cannot be achieved by limiting expression of 
hostile viewpoints (in the trademark arena or otherwise) while fostering 
expression of analogously supportive viewpoints.162 
V. HOW DISCRETION IN THE PTO LEADS TO  
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
As already described, examining attorneys at the PTO have broad 
discretion to grant or deny trademarks under section 2(a). This Part suggests 
that such discretion leads to arbitrary decisionmaking regarding the 
 
160 See Tam II, 785 F.3d at 577 (“Section 2(a)’s content-based restrictions on registerability 
were adopted to reduce use of trademarks the government deemed unsuitable (such as those that 
disparage)—no doubt a chilling effect on speech.”); cf. Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of N.Y. 
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding “Son of Sam” laws unconstitutional 
because a governmental burden imposed on speech based on its content disincentivizes that speech, thus 
“driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace” in violation of the First Amendment). 
161 See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1607 (2010) (“[A 
trademark] is both a commodity as well as a sign of speech and expressive significance.”); id. at 1617 
(“[A] trademark can serve commercial, expressive, and communicative functions for more than one 
party at the same time. Part of this shift is largely attributable to the changing role of trademarks in 
today’s culture. Especially in the modern era, trademarks are complex symbols of both corporate 
identity and consumer identity.” (citation omitted)). 
162 See Tam II, 785 F.3d at 582 (“Under this law, it is possible to register trademarks that refer to 
a certain group in a positive, or non-disparaging manner, but not trademarks that refer negatively to the 
same group. Section 2(a) discriminates against disparaging or offensive viewpoints. Under this analysis, 
§ 2(a) is presumptively invalid, and must satisfy strict scrutiny to be found constitutional.” (footnote 
omitted)); Voskanyan, supra note 32, at 1310 (“[Section] 2(a)’s singling out of ‘disparaging’ marks is 
a viewpoint-based regulation because it allows registration for marks that glorify, praise, or promote 
‘persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols’ but not for marks that take the opposite view.”). 
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scandalous or disparaging nature of marks on the basis of content and 
viewpoint. Considering that examiners are expressly instructed to disregard 
any First Amendment rights that the applicant may have in registering his 
mark,163 there is a high risk that examiners will discriminate against marks on 
the basis of the viewpoints they express without regard to the 
constitutionality of such decisions. Additionally, the section 2(a) standards 
are “stated broadly in terms of ‘taste,’ ‘morality,’ ‘politics,’ or ‘controversy’ on 
their face,” thus “permit[ting] too much discretion by the decisionmaker to 
discriminate according to viewpoint.”164  
A. Applying the Test for Improper Discretion 
Under the standards articulated by the courts, the discretion permitted by 
section 2(a) is outside the permissible bounds of the First Amendment. The 
determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is inherently 
subjective, requiring the “appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the 
formation of an opinion,” which is the exact scheme proscribed by Forsyth.165 
These decisions are inherently content-based because they are made on the 
basis of the mark’s content. Although the use of a mark is still permitted after 
being denied registration under section 2(a), denial still penalizes the mark 
owner based on what the mark expresses.166 These content-based 
determinations are “ineffective and highly arbitrary”167 because of both the 
limited evidence available to decisionmakers and the imprecise standards set 
forth by the TTAB.168  
Next, the standards set forth in section 2(a) and the accompanying 
guidance provided to examiners are not sufficiently narrow, objective, and 
 
163 See TMEP, supra note 2, § 1203.01 (“Refusal to register immoral or scandalous matter has 
been found not to abridge First Amendment rights, because no conduct is proscribed and no tangible 
form of expression is suppressed.”). This portion of the Manual does not cite to any relevant case 
law to support its proposition. 
164 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of 
Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 471 (2001). 
165 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1991) (quoting Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)). 
166 See Voskanyan, supra note 32, at 1303 (“Ability to use the particular mark without 
registration has nothing to do with and does not resolve the problem that the registration itself, as 
a grant of a valuable government benefit, is premised upon regulation of the trademark’s content. 
. . . [E]ven though an applicant may still use the mark as an unregistered trademark, denial of 
registration imposes a penalty for her particular choice of a mark solely because of its content.”). 
167 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 8, at 471. 
168 See supra Part III (discussing the effects of trademark denial on mark owners); see also 
Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 8, at 471 (“[T]he [section 2(a)] decision is made by judges and 
administrative agencies on a national level and a minority of hypothetically offended people can 
override the community standard of taste.” (citation omitted)). 
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definite. Although scandalousness and disparagement are particularized 
reasons for denial, as required by Thomas v. Chicago Park District,169 they are 
vague concepts that do not lead to consistent decisionmaking. As explained 
previously, the terms “scandalous” and “disparaging” are not defined in 
section 2(a) or the legislative history of the Lanham Act. The TMEP 
provides some clarification as to the meanings of the terms, but it does not 
provide objective standards to be used by examiners when analyzing 
applications. Examiners can rely on any type of evidence, objective or 
otherwise.170 In practice, they most commonly rely on dictionaries and the 
Internet and generally do not rely on the actual perceptions of the words by 
the general public or the allegedly disparaged group (unless, of course, 
members of that group had already brought such evidence forward). 
Although the examiner is required to justify a section 2(a) denial, there are 
no specific criteria set forth for an adequate justification. Examiners often 
simply recite case law and attach a definition of the word in question to 
support their denial decision.171 These explanations from examiners are in fact 
reviewable, but the First Amendment rights of the applicant are ignored 
pursuant to McGinley. This arguably leads to deference to the examiner’s 
decisionmaking, even if his evidentiary justification for denial is inadequate. 
Such deference to discretionary findings, combined with the low evidentiary 
requirements for examiner justification, allows examiners to deny marks 
under section 2(a) based solely on the viewpoints they express without 
sufficient recourse for a mark owner to challenge such a decision. 
B. Considering the Applicant’s Intent in Section 2(a) Analyses 
Without clear standards for whether and how to consider the applicant’s 
intent, examiners can choose whether or not to discriminate on the basis of 
intent when analyzing the scandalous or disparaging nature of the mark. If 
examiners explicitly consider intent, the potential for viewpoint 
discrimination increases because marks containing the same content could be 
selectively denied if the applicant asserted an intent to disparage or 
 
169 534 U.S. 316, 318 n.1, 323-24 (2002) (requiring that a “regulation contain adequate standards 
to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review”). 
170 See supra subsection I.C.2.a for a discussion of the types of evidence relied upon by examiners. 
171 See, e.g., SAME SHIT DIFFERENT CUBICLE, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78/546,094 (filed Jan. 12, 2005), Office Action Outgoing, Aug. 19, 2005, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/docu 
mentviewer?caseId=sn78546094&docId=OOA20050819093528#docIndex=2&page=1 [http://perma 
.cc/2YNF=SN4B] (denying mark as scandalous under section 2(a) while citing only one dictionary 
definition of “shit,” In re Mavety Media Group, and the TMEP). 
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scandalize.172 In the disparagement context, for example, marks that are 
neutral on their face could be selectively denied for applicants that intend the 
mark to refer to a group of people negatively, even though the same mark 
would be granted for applicants who assert positive or neutral intent. Such a 
regime “privileges some viewpoints over others” in violation of the First 
Amendment.173 On the other hand, if the examiner does not consider the 
registrant’s intent, there is a danger of restricting changing viewpoints in 
favor of historical ones, which is another form of viewpoint discrimination. 
This is particularly problematic when a former slur is reclaimed by members 
of the disparaged group, as in the DYKES ON BIKES174 and SLANTS175 
cases. Although “the reappropriation of terms that have historically 
disparaged marginalized groups is a common way for those same groups to 
reclaim the meaning of those terms and change social attitudes,”176 examiners 
ignore this evolution by denying the legitimacy of registration to marks that 
attempt such reclamation. 
Consideration of the intent of a section 2(a) applicant is referenced only 
once in the TMEP, and it is only with regard to disparaging marks. The 
TMEP advises, “[t]he fact that an applicant may be a member of that group 
or has good intentions underlying its use of a term does not obviate the fact 
that a substantial composite of the referenced group would find the term 
objectionable.”177 Intent can be considered, but only in light of “substantial 
composite” evidence.178 However, as shown in Part II, evidence of group 
members’ actual opinions on an allegedly disparaging term is rarely relied 
upon in section 2(a) decisions. The examiner can instead inject his own 
opinion of the substantial composite and disregard the applicant’s intended 
expression, thus employing viewpoint discrimination against that expression 
without any evidence to support the decision. Furthermore, no guidance is 
provided for considering intent in scandalousness analyses. Without any 
guidelines, examiners can inject evidence of intent when it suits the decision 
they wish to make, which can lead to viewpoint discrimination. For example, 
 
172 See Smith, supra note 52, at 472 (“If the party’s assertions, rather than the numerous 
potential interpretations of a trademark, determine success in registration, the party’s viewpoint is 
being selectively evaluated.”). 
173 Id. at 474. 
174 See Kiser, supra note 35, at 1-3 (chronicling the four-year struggle of a lesbian motorcycle 
organization to overcome section 2(a) denials for the registration of the mark DYKES ON BIKES). 
175 See infra subsection V.D.2 (discussing registration of the mark SLANTS in greater detail). 
176 Esha Bhandari, ‘You’re Not Wrong, You’re Just an A**hole,’ ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (Mar. 6, 
2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/youre-not-wrong-youre-just-ahole [https://perma.cc/ 
DB8P-YX99]. 
177 TMEP, supra note 2, § 1203.03(b)(i). 
178 Id. 
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if the examiner seeks to deny as scandalous marks that are overtly sexual in 
nature, the examiner could both deny a facially neutral mark that the mark 
owner intends to be sexual (an innuendo, for example) and a mark that 
appears sexual but is expressly intended to be neutral. Within the current 
rules, the examiner can manipulate the consideration of intent to deny marks 
on the basis of the viewpoint expressed. 
C. Considering the Context of the Mark in Section 2(a) Analyses 
Consideration of the context of the mark has been inconsistently applied 
by the PTO, further risking viewpoint discrimination. In scandalousness 
review, marks are supposed to be considered “in the context of the relevant 
marketplace for the goods or services identified in the application.”179 In the 
disparagement context, marks are supposed to be considered “as used on or 
in connection with the relevant goods or services.”180 However, the TTAB 
has essentially ruled that certain words, such as profanities, are disparaging 
or scandalous per se.181 The contrasting consideration of context leads to dual 
problems: marks that are “innocent” can be deemed scandalous based on their 
context (therefore discriminating against the expression of that context), or 
words that are viewed as scandalous per se will be denied regardless of their 
context (therefore discriminating against the expression symbolized by the 
word itself).182 Additionally, “a trier of fact predisposed to find the mark 
unregistrable per se may rely on the mark owner’s recitation of goods or 
services to establish an expansive potential audience.”183 Taking context into 
account can therefore bolster an arbitrary decision based on viewpoint 
discrimination. If an expansive audience will be exposed to the mark, the 
examiner can argue that a “substantial composite” of that audience will be 
scandalized or disparaged in support of his opinion—regardless of whether 
the examiner has actual evidence to that effect (which is unlikely to be the 
case, considering the PTO’s reliance on dictionaries and other non-
representative evidence). Per se determinations would limit the arbitrary 
 
179 Id. § 1203.01. 
180 Id. § 1203.03(b)(i). 
181 See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing profanity). 
182 See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter Under 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered Trademark?, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 331, 349 n.88 (1993) (“Under Riverbank Canning, the trier of fact should examine whether 
the intrinsic nature of the covered goods or services renders an otherwise innocent mark scandalous, 
immoral, or disparaging. In contrast, however, McGinley suggests that any doubts concerning an 
arguably unregistrable mark per se may be resolved against its owner if the unrestricted distribution or 
provision of the covered goods or services would increase the likelihood of the mark’s exposure to 
individuals particularly susceptible to being scandalized or disparaged.”). 
183 Id. at 349 (emphasis added). 
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application of context to suit a preferred outcome, and “avoid imposing 
competitive penalties on particular industries”184 that express ideas and 
viewpoints perceived to be scandalous by examiners (even if not perceived as 
such by the general public). 
On the other hand, a determination that a mark is scandalous per se based 
solely on its dictionary definition fails to reflect the evolving perceptions of 
consumers and group members, which can lead to the examiner injecting his 
own, perhaps outdated, opinion of a mark into his analysis.185 Tinseltown, for 
example, essentially forecloses all future registrations of the word “bullshit” 
regardless of whether the context of the mark indicates a newer meaning that 
has become superior to the scandalous meaning in that particular context.186 
Additionally, a failure to consider context for disparagement could lead to 
denials for words that, in context, have alternative meanings. For example, if 
a mark for “redskins” is used on potatoes with red skin or other goods that 
depict such potatoes, the allegedly per se disparaging word would be used in 
a completely non-disparaging way. Per se rules would foreclose registration 
in all contexts, whereas a consideration of context would result in reflection 
on the actual meaning of the mark rather than on the basis of the view 
expressed by the irrelevant disparaging or scandalous meaning. 
D. Case Studies: Viewpoint Discrimination in the Redskins and Slants Cases 
The arbitrariness of decisionmaking under section 2(a) has recently led to 
viewpoint discrimination in two prominent cases. First, in the ongoing saga 
calling for cancellation of all trademarks of the Washington Redskins, 
decisionmakers in the PTO, TTAB, and federal courts have inconsistently 
and arbitrarily decided the disparaging nature of the marks using the exact 
same information. Second, the section 2(a) denial of the mark THE 
SLANTS for a band consisting of Asian-American members demonstrates 
viewpoint discrimination against the reclamation of a slur by a member of 
the allegedly disparaged group. 
 
184 Id. at 382. 
185 See Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 8, at 469 (“[T]he appropriate focus is not simply the 
meaning of the word or phrase, but the way that word or phrase is perceived by a substantial 
composite of consumers. A centralized focus on dictionary definitions fails to inquire as to the degree 
of perceived scandal, shock, or offense to consumers in the marketplace.”). 
186 In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
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1. Cancellation of the Washington Redskins Trademarks 
The trademarks owned by Pro-Football, Inc. that represent the 
Washington Redskins football team have long been the subject of controversy 
and debate. The name has been used by the team since the 1930s,187 and the 
trademarks were registered without controversy or fanfare between 1967 and 
1990.188 However, many consider “redskin” to be a racist slur in reference to 
Native Americans. Native American groups and other protestors have 
pressured the team to change the name since at least the 1940s, and the 
pressure continues to this day.189 Part of the pressure has involved legal action 
attempting to cancel the Redskins’ marks to strip them of the benefits of 
registration on the Principal Register. The first cancellation action was 
filed by Susan Harjo in 1992.190 The TTAB decided to cancel the marks under 
section 2(a) in 1999, relying on linguistic and testimonial evidence showing 
that the term “redskin” was disparaging to a substantial composite of the 
Native American community at the time the Washington Redskins marks 
were registered.191 When the mark owners appealed the decision to the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, however, the court reversed the 
cancellation decision, finding that the evidence presented was insufficient to 
demonstrate disparagement.192 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case on other 
grounds, but did not disturb the lower court’s findings.193 
A new set of plaintiffs, led by Amanda Blackhorse, filed another 
cancellation petition while Harjo was still pending.194 The new plaintiffs’ 
arguments were exactly the same as those in the Harjo case—that the 
Redskins trademarks were disparaging to a substantial composite of Native 
Americans at the time of registration—and relied on the exact same 
 
187 See Tom Pollin, Dropping Back in NFL History: Lone Star and the Redskins, FOOTBALL 
NATION (June 6, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://www.footballnation.com/content/dropping-back-nfl-history-
lone-star-and-the-redskins/22983/2 [http://perma.cc/MF84-YHMD] (explaining the franchise’s name 
change from “Braves” to “Redskins” in 1933 to avoid confusion with the “Braves” baseball team). 
188 Blackhorse I, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1081 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
189 See, e.g., Stephen Pevar, Why “Redskins” Is Wrong, ACLU (Nov. 25, 2013), https:// 
www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/why-redskins-wrong [http://perma.cc/PE5Q-LJT2] (arguing that 
“Redskin” is a “vile name”); Scott Simpson, National Civil and Human Rights Coalition Calls for 
Washington Football Team to Drop Offensive Name, LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (Dec. 
12, 2013), http://www.civilrights.org/press/2013/washington-football-team-name-change-resolution. 
html [http://perma.cc/LF7G-ABZH] (describing the resolution passed by the Leadership Conference on 
Civil and Human Rights calling for the Washington Redskins to change the team’s name). 
190 Harjo I, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1706 n.1 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
191 Id. at 1748-49. 
192 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo (Harjo II), 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 135-36 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding 
that the TTAB’s determination that the Redskins marks were considered disparaging by a substantial 
composite of Native Americans was not supported by substantial evidence). 
193 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo (Harjo III), 415 F.3d 44, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
194 Blackhorse I, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1084 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
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evidentiary record.195 Without regard to the findings of the District Court in 
Harjo II, the TTAB cancelled the marks under section 2(a) as disparaging in 
June 2014.196 Pro-Football filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia against 
the Blackhorse parties seeking to reverse the TTAB’s determination.197 The 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Blackhorse parties, upholding 
the TTAB’s decision and finding that the cancellation of the Redskins marks 
was proper under section 2(a) and did not implicate the First Amendment.198 
Pro-Football filed its appeal to the Fourth Circuit on August 6, 2015.199 
The TTAB’s decision in Blackhorse I illustrates the PTO’s arbitrary 
decisionmaking under section 2(a). The TTAB and examiners acted 
arbitrarily and beyond the scope of their section 2(a) authority by taking the 
public discourse surrounding the Redskins marks (and perhaps their personal 
dislike of the Redskins marks) into consideration in ruling on the petition for 
cancellation—a clear case of viewpoint discrimination. The examiners and 
the TTAB in Blackhorse I relied upon virtually the same record as the District 
Court in Harjo II, but came to the opposite conclusion. The only additional 
evidence submitted were depositions by the named Blackhorse plaintiffs 
stating that they found the Redskins marks offensive, essentially mimicking 
similar depositions submitted by the original Harjo plaintiffs.200 For multiple 
reasons, the Harjo II court found this evidence insufficient to support a 
finding that the Redskins marks may disparage Native Americans. First, the 
court held that the TTAB failed to weigh conflicting evidence of 
disparagement and non-disparagement presented by the parties, and that its 
findings of fact did not “tend to prove or disprove that the marks at issue 
‘may disparage’ Native Americans, during the relevant timeframe, especially 
when used in the context of Pro-Football’s entertainment services.”201 
Second, the TTAB conflated the opinion of the general public with the 
opinion of a substantial composite of Native Americans; it failed to cite any 
evidence from Native Americans apart from the plaintiffs’ depositions—who, 
as only seven people, cannot make up a substantial composite of a disparaged 
 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 1114. 
197 Complaint at 1, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d (E.D. Va. 2014) (1:14-cv-
01043-GBL-IDD). A party dissatisfied with the decision of the TTAB has the option to either appeal 
to the Federal Circuit or to initiate a civil action in federal district court. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2012).  
198 Blackhorse II, No. 1:14-cv-01043-GBL-IDD, 2015 WL 4096277, at *11 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015). 
199 Docketing Notice, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015).  
200 See Blackhorse I, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115 (Bergsman, A.L.J., dissenting) (“The 
evidence from Harjo was augmented by depositions of the individual petitioners here, each of whom 
testified that they found the term ‘redskins’ in the challenged marks offensive.”); id. at 1115 n.229 
(“The petitioners did not resubmit the depositions of the Harjo petitioners in this case.”). 
201 Harjo II, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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group.202 Finally, the TTAB failed to consider that dictionary definitions and 
historical evidence did not consistently support the finding that the term was 
disparaging, particularly in light of the term’s secondary meaning in relation 
to the football team.203 
The court in Harjo II found that “the existence of a controversy” does not 
prove that the Redskins marks were disparaging to a substantial composite of 
Native Americans at the time the marks were registered.204 However, the 
TTAB appears to have taken the mounting controversy into account in the 
Blackhorse cancellation by finding that the exact same evidence—deemed 
insufficient to support a disparagement cancellation in 2003—had 
inexplicably become sufficient to support a cancellation in 2014. The 
Blackhorse decision takes into account that the term “redskin” has become 
increasingly unpopular, disfavored, and viewed as racist.205 However, terms 
that express such disfavored opinions are still protected by the First 
Amendment. By exercising their discretion to cancel the Redskins marks, in 
spite of the Harjo II precedent finding the evidence insufficient to support 
cancellation, the examiners and the TTAB have engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination against the mark owners, inhibiting their speech because the 
ideas being expressed are unpopular. While public pressure on the Redskins 
mark owners to change the team name is an entirely appropriate method to 
combat the use of an allegedly racist mark, this discretionary, arbitrary decision 
regulating viewpoint is patently unconstitutional. 
2. Denying Registration to the Slants Trademark 
Although less prominent than the Washington Redskins debate, the 
decisions made by examiners, the TTAB, and the Federal Circuit regarding 
a trademark for a band called “The Slants” also reflect the PTO’s arbitrary 
decisionmaking and practice of viewpoint discrimination. Applicant Simon 
Shiao Tam, an Asian-American musician, applied to trademark the name of 
his band, “The Slants.”206 All of the band’s members are of Asian-American 
descent, and the band uses Asian imagery in its logos and marketing 
materials.207 Tam has stated that he called the band by this name to “reclaim” 
 
202 See id. at 129 (“By focusing on the general public and inferring that the Native Americans would 
simply agree with those views, the TTAB made a decision unsupported by substantial evidence.”). 
203 Id. at 130-32. 
204 Id. at 135. 
205 Blackhorse I, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111 (“The recognition that this racial designation 
based on skin color is disparaging to Native Americans is also demonstrated by the near complete 
drop-off in usage of ‘redskins’ as a reference to Native Americans beginning in the 1960’s.”). 
206 THE SLANTS, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/472,044 (filed Nov. 14, 2011). 
207 Note that Tam did not apply for a trademark on this imagery, only on the band name. 
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the stereotypical, racist identity of the term as a tongue-in-cheek sign of 
pride.208 However, the PTO refused to recognize Tam’s intent, denying the 
mark at the application stage under section 2(a) as disparaging to people of 
Asian descent.209 The TTAB upheld the denial,210 and Tam appealed to the 
Federal Circuit, arguing that section 2(a) denials infringe upon the First 
Amendment rights of trademark owners.211  
In Tam II, the Federal Circuit held that Tam’s mark was properly denied 
under the Harjo framework.212 The panel determined that the examiner’s and 
TTAB’s findings that THE SLANTS may be disparaging to people of Asian 
descent were supported by substantial evidence.213 The court also reaffirmed 
that McGinley is the controlling precedent, and as such the denial of Tam’s 
mark under section 2(a) did not implicate the First Amendment.214 
However, Judge Kimberly Moore filed a separate nonbinding opinion in 
Tam II, entitled “Additional Views,” in which she argued that the Federal 
Circuit should reconsider its section 2(a) precedent en banc215 and declare 
section 2(a) an unconstitutional restriction on speech and viewpoint under 
the First Amendment.216 She asserted that Tam’s mark is both commercial 
and expressive because it identifies Tam’s band in the commercial 
marketplace but also “weigh[s] in on cultural and political discussions about 
race and society,” which are at the core of First Amendment protection.217 
Judge Moore then argued, contrary to the assertion in McGinley, that a section 
2(a) denial does burden the speech of trademark owners by denying them 
both the rights conferred by registration and common-law trademark-use 
protection.218 Therefore, she argued, the restrictions imposed by section 2(a) 
 
208 Scott Graham, Oregon Band ‘The Slants’ Takes Trademark Fight to Federal Circuit, 
RECORDER (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202714640761/Oregon-Band-The-Slants-
Takes-Trademark-Fight-to-Federal-Circuit#ixzz3QhsxWf00 [http://perma.cc/PA35-QVLQ]. 
209 THE SLANTS, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/472,044 (filed Nov. 14, 2011), 
Office Action Outgoing, June 20, 2012, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85472044 
&docId=OOA20120620173329#docIndex=5&page=1 [http://perma.cc/F3BC-SLAF]. 
210 In re Tam (Tam I), 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
211 Brief on Behalf of Appellant, In re Tam, No. 2014-1203 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 21, 2014). 
212 Tam II, 785 F.3d 567, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
213 Id. at 571. 
214 Id. at 571-72. 
215 The Federal Circuit can only overturn its precedent through a hearing and decision en 
banc. See U.S. CT. APPEALS FED. CIR., INTERNAL OPERATING PROC., § 13.1 (Nov. 14, 2008) 
(“En banc consideration is required to overrule a prior holding of this or a predecessor court 
expressed in an opinion having precedential status.”). 
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must be assessed under the First Amendment.219 Applying First Amendment 
doctrines, Judge Moore concluded that section 2(a) is a restriction on 
viewpoint and thus must be assessed under strict scrutiny.220 However, she 
also concluded that the law likely cannot withstand even the intermediate 
scrutiny applied to commercial speech because there is no legitimate 
government interest to support its application.221 
One week after Tam II, the Federal Circuit voted sua sponte to vacate the 
opinion and rehear the case en banc.222 The court specifically requested new 
briefing on the constitutionality of section 2(a) under the First Amendment. 
On December 22, 2015, a majority of the court determined that the 
disparagement provision of section 2(a) is unconstitutional on its face under 
the First Amendment, explicitly overturning McGinley.223 However, the 
court also reinstated the panel’s holding that THE SLANTS is a disparaging 
mark.224 In light of these determinations, the court vacated the TTAB’s decision 
that Tam’s mark is unregistrable and remanded the case for reconsideration.225  
Tam’s case further demonstrates that the PTO and courts have made 
section 2(a) decisions arbitrarily, therefore leading to viewpoint discrimination. 
To date, Tam’s marks are the only marks with “slant” in the name that have 
been denied under section 2(a).226 The word does have non-disparaging 
meanings. In Tam’s case, however, the PTO found disparagement by taking 
into account the context surrounding the mark—i.e., the Asian imagery 
associated with the name. The Federal Circuit panel decision also considered 
Tam’s stated intention to reclaim the Asian stereotype of slanted eyes when 
determining that the mark referred to Asians in a disparaging manner.227 In 
the other “slant” denials, intent was not considered because it was apparently 
assumed that the marks were being used under the non-disparaging meaning. 
This is an explicit discrimination on the basis of the idea that “slants” is a 
slur, even though Tam did not intend to use it as such. The examiner’s 
decision to consider Tam’s stated intent privileges applicants who do not 
 
219 See id. at 581 (“The government cannot hinge the benefits of federal trademark registration 
on constitutionally protected speech—here, the applicant’s selection of a suitable mark—unless the 
government’s actions pass constitutional scrutiny.”). 
220 See id. at 582 (arguing that section 2(a) discriminates against disparaging viewpoints while 
allowing registrations for positive, non-disparaging marks that refer to groups of people). 
221 Id.  
222 Order for Sua Sponte Hearing En Banc, In re Tam, No. 2014-1203 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2015). 
223 Tam III, No. 14-1203, slip op. at 8 n.1. 
224 Id. at 12 n.3. 
225 Id. at 62. 
226 See infra Appendix, Table 2. 
227 See Tam II, 785 F.3d at 570-71 (describing interviews with Tam and the Asian imagery 
associated with the band to support the conclusion that “The Slants” mark disparagingly refers to 
people of Asian descent). 
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express their intent in using the word “slant,” even if it was meant in a 
disparaging fashion, over Tam’s stated intent to reclaim a traditionally 
offensive term.228 Such an outcome is discrimination against Tam’s view that 
the word should be reclaimed by the Asian-American community as a point 
of pride rather than a point of disparagement. 
In Tam’s case, there was also no substantial evidence that the mark was 
actually disparaging to a substantial composite of Asian Americans, which 
highlights the discretionary nature of the decision. The only evidence the 
TTAB considered when construing the opinions of Asian Americans were 
articles indicating that two Oregon-based Asian-American organizations 
found Tam’s mark “racially offensive.”229 The opinions of these two localized 
groups are not enough to show that a substantial composite of the Asian-
American community finds the term disparaging; in fact, they may not even 
represent a substantial composite of the opinions of the Asian-American 
community in Oregon. Therefore, the evidence relied upon by the examiner 
and TTAB was insufficient to support a finding of disparagement. Without 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of disparagement, the examiner’s 
decision and the subsequent affirmances by the TTAB and Federal Circuit 
are arbitrary and discriminate against Tam solely based on the viewpoint that 
his mark expresses.  
VI. CHANGES TO THE SECTION 2(A) REGIME: LIMITING  
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
Since the current application of section 2(a) has led to viewpoint 
discrimination at both the examination and appeal stages, changes must be 
made to avoid continued First Amendment violations. Some have proposed 
eliminating section 2(a) as a wholly unconstitutional restriction on the 
registration of allegedly disparaging and scandalous trademarks.230 However, 
I argue in this Part that the law can remain intact if the procedures at the 
PTO are reined in and specified to prevent discretionary decisions by 
examiners on the basis of the viewpoints expressed within marks. 
 
228 See supra Section V.B (discussing the use of intent in section 2(a) analyses). 
229 Tam I, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1308 (T.T.A.B. 2013). At the Federal Circuit, the PTO 
also presented a brochure from the Japanese American Citizens League that described the term 
“slant” as “demeaning,” but this brochure does not appear to refer specifically to Tam’s mark. Tam 
II, 785 F.3d at 571. 
230 See, e.g., Tam III, No. 14-1203, slip op. at 62 (holding section 2(a) unconstitutional because 
it violates the First Amendment); Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and 
American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia at 3, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d 
498 (E.D. Va. 2014) (1:14-cv-01043-GBL-IDD) (advocating for the court to strike down section 
2(a)’s prohibition on the registration of scandalous, immoral, and disparaging marks). 
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First, the PTO should actually presume that potentially disparaging or 
scandalous marks are valid at the examination stage and refrain from ruling 
on section 2(a) issues until there has been an opportunity for opposition. 
Oppositions can bring forth more compelling, specific evidence of 
scandalousness or disparagement that an examiner cannot or would not 
consider at the initial phase, and therefore reduce the risk of an examiner 
relying on his own assumptions regarding public or group-wide perception 
of an allegedly scandalous or disparaging term. These arbitrary assumptions, 
conscious or not, can lead to viewpoint discrimination. In the Tam case, for 
example, the examiner presupposed that the term “slants” was considered 
disparaging by a substantial composite of Asian Americans without sufficient 
evidence of such an opinion. If a section 2(a) determination had been 
foreclosed until the examination phase, community members could have 
presented high-quality evidence, such as survey data and personal affidavits, 
to demonstrate that the group finds the term disparaging. If no one came 
forward, Tam’s argument that the term had been reclaimed by the 
community could have been assumed to be an accurate representation of 
group sentiment. Without input from the relevant group, the examiner had 
no basis on which to presume disparagement aside from his own opinions and 
discretion, thus leading to viewpoint discrimination. 
Second, discretionary decisionmaking stemming from these viewpoint-
based assumptions can be reduced by limiting what can be defined as a 
scandalous or disparaging mark to clearly defined categories of unprotected 
speech, such as obscenity and fighting words.231 Such a policy would prevent 
viewpoint discrimination because trademarks would not be denied on the 
basis of the ideas they express unless the ideas themselves are not protected 
by the First Amendment. At the same time, the policy would still serve to 
deter applicants from using harmful speech in their trademarks by limiting 
the benefits of trademark registration to traditionally protected areas of 
speech. Since the categories of unprotected speech are very narrow, more 
marks would receive the benefits of registration while still keeping harmful 
and extremely offensive marks out of the marketplace. 
Finally, a wholly deferential approach to section 2(a) cases—allowing 
the trademarks to be registered despite being potentially scandalous or 
disparaging—would shift the regulation of these marks from the 
government to the marketplace. Both the commercial marketplace and the 
marketplace of ideas can exert pressure on the users of “undesirable” marks 
without relying on a government entity to interfere with the mark holders’ 
 
231 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing categories of traditionally unprotected 
speech). 
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First Amendment rights.232 Under such a policy, restriction of these types of 
trademarks would not be state-sponsored viewpoint discrimination, but rather 
would constitute voluntary conformance to publicly perceived standards of 
scandalousness and disparagement. 
CONCLUSION 
The discretion-laden policies at the PTO under the section 2(a) regime 
of denying and cancelling trademark registrations clearly constitute 
viewpoint discrimination. Since neither the PTO nor the courts have 
articulated clear evidentiary standards for denying trademarks for being 
scandalous or disparaging, trademark examiners and the TTAB substitute 
their own opinions and judgment for the actual perceptions of the relevant 
public. This discretion has led to arbitrary grants and denials of marks under 
section 2(a), indicating examiners’ ability to covertly deny registration to 
marks on the basis of the viewpoints that they express. To cure this violation 
of the First Amendment, the PTO should employ section 2(a) policies that 
are more deferential to mark holders. By presuming that marks are valid 
unless members of the scandalized or disparaged public come forward to 
oppose the mark’s registration, the government will avoid making 
determinations on the basis of taste, morality, and controversy. This would 
allow the marketplaces of commerce and ideas to determine which marks are 
worthy of reaping the benefits of trademark registration. The Federal 
Circuit’s recent determination that the disparagement provision of section 
2(a) is untenable under the First Amendment is a promising indicator that 
the regime of viewpoint discrimination at the PTO and TTAB may soon 
come to an end. However, even if other circuits or the Supreme Court 
ultimately determine that section 2(a) does not wholly violate the First 
Amendment, the policies in place to implement and enforce the law at the 
administrative level must change to ensure it is applied in a constitutional 
manner that does not discriminate against trademarks on the basis of the 
viewpoints they express.  
  
 
232 See Gabe Rottman, Redskins Wrong, But Legal, ACLU (Dec. 10, 2013, 10:41 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/redskins-wrong-legal [http://perma.cc/6TQP-66P3] (arguing that although 
the Washington Redskins should succumb to public pressure and change the name of the team, 
relying on government standards to determine what is disparaging is at odds with the protections 
of the First Amendment). 
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APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL DATA 






































































Asshole 16 15 15 0 0 0 1 
Fuck 120 116 111 5 0 0 4 
MILF 59 30 20 10 28 2 1 
Piss 34 7 2 5 25 0 2 
Shit 106 97 93 4 3 1 6 
Slut 107 34 4 30 70 2 3 
Tits 47 29 23 6 15 0 3 
WTF 81 26 0 26 44 1 11 
 


































































































Asshole 0.00% 100.00% N/A 
Fuck 0.00% 95.69% N/A 
MILF 47.46% 66.67% 7.14% 
Piss 73.53% 28.57% 0.00% 
Shit 2.83% 95.88% 33% 
Slut 65.42% 11.76% 2.86% 
Tits 31.91% 79.31% 0.00% 
WTF 54.32% 0.00% 2.27% 
  
2016] Discriminatory Discretion 559 
 





































































Chink 5 4 1 3 1 0 0 
Dyke 16 5 1 4 11 5 0 
Fag 27 10 7 3 17 3 0 
Faggot 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 
Hebe 11 6 0 6 5 1 0 
Heeb 4 3 3 0 1 0 0 
Jap 7 4 2 2 3 0 0 
Nigga 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 
Nigger 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 
Queer 62 16 0 16 45 0 1 
Redskin 18 10 4 6 8 0 0 
Slant 71 6 2 4 65 0 0 




* Any trademarks belonging to Pro-Football, Inc. (owner of the Washington Redskins trademarks) 
were excluded from this analysis, since review of their cancellation is pending in the Fourth Circuit. 
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Chink 20.00% 25.00% 0% 
Dyke 68.75% 20.00% 45% 
Fag 62.96% 70.00% 18% 
Faggot 0.00% 100.00% N/A 
Hebe 45.45% 0.00% 20% 
Heeb 25.00% 100.00% 0% 
Jap 42.86% 50.00% 0% 
Nigga 0.00% 100.00% N/A 
Nigger 0.00% 100.00% N/A 
Queer 72.58% 0.00% 0% 
Redskin 44.44% 40.00% 0% 
Slant 91.55% 33.33% 0% 
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Asshole 0 15 2 2 2 
Fuck 3 99 35 5 7 
MILF 0 10 22 0 3 
Piss 0 1 2 0 0 
Shit 6 76 17 9 3 
Slut 0 4 2 0 0 
Tits 0 22 5 1 2 
WTF 0 1 1 0 0 
 




































































Asshole 0.00% 100.00% 13.33% 13.33% 
Fuck 2.70% 89.19% 31.53% 4.50% 
MILF 0.00% 45.45% 100.00% 0.00% 
Piss 0.00% 50.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Shit 6.38% 80.85% 18.09% 9.57% 
Slut 0.00% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 
Tits 0.00% 95.65% 21.74% 4.35% 
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Chink 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Dyke 0 6 1 1 2 1 0 
Fag 1 9 3 0 1 0 0 
Faggot 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Hebe N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Heeb 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 
Jap 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Nigga 0 9 2 0 1 0 0 
Nigger 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 
Queer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Redskin 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 
Slant 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 
Squaw 0 6 0 0 5 5 2 
 








































































































Chink 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dyke 0.00% 100.00% 16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 16.67% 
Fag 10.00% 90.00% 30.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 
Faggot 0.00% 100.00% 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 
Hebe 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Heeb 0.00% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 
Jap 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 
Nigga 0.00% 100.00% 22.22% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 
Nigger 0.00% 80.00% 60.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Queer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Redskin 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Slant 0.00% 50.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 50.00% 
Squaw 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 83.33% 83.33% 
 
